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Abstract of Thesis
The thesis starts by describing those aspects of economic theory which 
are relevant to the construction of dynamic models of exchange rates. The 
deterministic flexible price monetary model, and the deterministic price in­
ertia (Dombusch) model are then derived for two countries of similar size. 
The implied restrictions on the economic parameters of the models due to 
no-arbitrage considerations when three countries are connected are also in­
vestigated. A variation of the price inertia model in which the relevant eco­
nomic variables and the price adjustment procedure, are in current value 
terms rather than traditional volumes, is then investigated. The resulting 
systems of ordinary differential equations are solved for the nominal and real 
exchange rate, and the implied limiting values for these exchange rates are 
considered.
The thesis subsequently describes the extension of the flexible price mone­
tary model and the price inertia model, to formulations containing a stochas­
tic variable. The differential equations describing the models are derived 
using stochastic calculus, and quantitative and qualitative solutions are ob­
tained for the two models, respectively. The thesis then shows how the 
stochastic models can be used to describe the movement of the exchange 
rate in a target zone.
Finally, an extension of the stochastic flexible price monetary model is 
considered for a small network of more than two countries. The situation 
in which some countries in the network have a target zone imposed on their 
exchange rate while others have freely floating rates is considered. In partic­
ular, the solution describing the movement of the exchange rate between two 
countries, one of which is participating in a target zone arrangement with 
a third country, is derived. These models are then extended to cover the 
situation of a small network of countries in which one of them has a central 
position compared with the others.
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Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to provide a critical exposition and assessment 
of the literature relevant to the formulation of the two main mechanisms for 
describing exchange rate movements, the monetary and price inertia models. 
After discussing the basic economic framework in Chapter 1, we will continue 
in Chapter 2 to present a coherent derivation of the deterministic versions of 
the flexible price monetary model and of the price inertia model. Both models 
will be formulated in their most general terms for two countries of similar 
size, rather than one domain being considered as ‘the rest of the world’ which 
is a simplifying approach adopted in most standard texts. Explicit solutions 
for how the exchange rate moves with time will be obtained under certain 
conditions, and the important overshooting phenomenon of the price inertia 
model will be discussed. In addition, the existing results will be extended 
by examining what, if any, restrictions are implied for the parameters of the 
models, if networks of more than two countries are considered.
In most standard texts it is assumed that in the derivation of the price 
inertia model the macroeconomic parameters are the same for the two coun­
tries considered. However, in Chapter 3, it will be shown that traetability of 
the analysis is little changed if different macroeconomic parameters are as­
sumed. In addition, the Chapter shows that with an alternative formulation 
of the basic equations in nominal, rather them in the more usual real terms, 
a range of limiting behaviour of the exchange rate with time can be deduced. 
These new results indicate that by incorporating such changes into the for­
mulation of the model it is possible to obtain a mechanism for explaining 
why observed exchange rates have a greater volatility than the fundamental 
variables, such as money supply, upon which they are assumed to depend. 
As such, the mechanism offers an alternative to the overshooting effect of the 
price inertia model for describing this phenomenon.
Chapter 4 contains an exposition of the relatively new literature con­
cerned with the stochastic versions of the monetary find price inertia models. 
For the monetary model it is shown how, with the aid of stochastic calcu­
lus, an explicit solution can be obtained for the movement of the exchange 
rate in relation to the fundamental variables of the model. In the case of 
the price inertia model, although an explicit solution cannot in general be 
obtained, the qualitative nature of the solution paths can be described. In 
the following Chapter we apply both stochastic models to the description of 
how the exchange rate moves in a target zone, as this was one of the main
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motivating reasons for the development of stochastic models by researchers 
such as Krugman. Chapter 5 also considers the relevant boundary conditions 
needed to obtain solutions, a topic which has become an important subject 
in the literature because of its relationship to areas of research in finance.
In Chapter 6, the approach of Jorgensen and Mikkelsen to applying 
stochastic target zone models to networks having a third country not in­
volved in the target zone is discussed. This approach is then extended to 
cover the new situation of networks containing multiple target zones, and it 
is shown how explicit solutions for exchange rate movements between coun­
tries in different zones can be obtained. Finally, the previously unconsidered 
situation of a network with one country having a central role is discussed. 
The analysis indicates that it is possible to have target zones between each 
non-central country and the country with a central role, without potential 
conflict, provided all interventions are performed by the non-central coun­
tries. The result is of interest because it gives some justification for the 
non-intervention policy of Germany in the ‘black Wednesday’ crisis when the 
UK came out of the ERM.
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1 Econom ic framework
1.1 The exchange rate
This chapter aims to define a number of the most important variables and 
their relationships, which are referred to in later sections of the thesis. Many 
of the descriptions find derivations are given in fairly ‘non-technical’ terms, 
since the economic theory and justification behind those relationships is not 
the primary aim of this thesis. However, some rationale of the ‘building 
blocks’ which go in to the formulation of exchange rate models is important 
in order to understand the nature of the models and the interpretation of 
results stemming from their use. As a first step, we need to consider pre­
cisely what we mean by an exchange rate. The exchange rate between two 
countries can be defined in various ways but the conventional means of do­
ing so is as follows. The exchange rate, denoted by is the price of a 
unit of country 2’s currency, measured in units of country l ’s currency. For 
example, if country 1 is the United Kingdom and country 2 is the United 
States of America, then £>12 would be the number of pounds Sterling per 
dollar. Of course, the exchange rate between the two countries may vary 
over time unless efforts are made to keep it fixed, and even then the rate will 
inevitably change at some point, as it has done in all ‘fixed’ exchange rate 
regimes. Therefore, the exchange rate can be considered as a function of time 
£, that is, more formally the exchange rate should be written as Sn(t).  In 
particular, and unless otherwise stated, Su{t)  will be the rate for exchanging 
money at the moment of time t, that is the so called spot exchange rate. 
Other interpretations of an exchange rate axe possible, such as the rate for 
exchanging money in say, time t plus a year, which would be a forward ex­
change rate. In general, unless we need to emphasise the dependency on 
time, we shall simply use the notation S12 for the rate. The dependency of 
the exchange rate on time is not purely arbitrary, since many variables could 
affect its movement, and in various ways. In Chapter 2 we shall discuss two 
of the most important models which attempt to describe their relationship.
1.2 Purchasing power parity
Suppose that we consider two goods which we shall label A and B, that are 
traded within a certain country, but produced in possibly different locations. 
Let P A(t) and P B(t) be the price at time t, for which they are traded in the
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locations in which they are produced. Again, unless we need to emphasise 
the dependency on time, t  will be suppressed in what follows. Let us consider 
the situation when these two goods are perfect, or at least close, substitutes. 
If product A  was available for sale at, say, £5 less than product 13, then there 
would be an incentive for some entrepreneur to purchase as many items of 
product A  as they could afford and then resell them at (or slightly below) 
the price at which product B was selling. Since the two products are close 
or perfect substitutes, consumers would have no~hesitation in preferring to 
purchase product A over product B.  This would have the effect of driving 
up the price of product A, by increasing its demand; driving down the price 
of product B y and, in the process, make a profit for the entrepreneur. The 
incentive to continue the process will cease when the two prices are equal, as 
there will then be no profit. This result is known as th e law  o f one price, 
and is usually stated as follows; if two goods are identical, they must sell for 
the same price. In addition, the process of exploiting the price differential is 
known as arbitrage. It may be defined as follows. A rbitrage is the process 
of buying or selling something in order to exploit a price differential so as to 
make a riskless profit.
In the present context, the ‘something’ which is being bought and sold is 
a good or service, however, it may also be assumed to apply to earnings from 
securities. The implications of this latter assumption will be discussed when 
we consider Uncovered Interest Rate Parity, later in this chapter. Returning 
for the present to our example of the law of one price; in the derivation of this 
result it was implicitly assumed that there would be no other costs influencing 
our entrepreneur. However, in practice there may well be extra expenses, such 
as transport costs associated with obtaining and moving product A to the 
current purchasers of product B.  These extra costs are what we shall refer to 
as transaction  costs, and may be defined as all the costs associated with 
a transaction, over and above the cost of the good which actually changes 
hands. If we consider our example of two products again but now with the 
possibility of transaction costs being involved, it is not difficult to see that 
arbitrage will cease provided that
P B - P A < c
where c is the total transaction costs of supplying a unit of product A  in 
place of product B.  The maximum selling price for product B  can therefore 
be considered to be
9
P B =  PA +  C. (1)
Suppose now that the two products are produced in different countries 
but that trading between these two countries is allowed. Let us assume that 
product A is produced in country 2 and sells domestically at a price P2 , while 
product B is produced in country 1 and sells in that country at a price Pi. 
Let us further assume, for the present at least, that the transaction costs in 
supplying product A in place of product B  are negligible. Then applying the 
law of one price to trade in these substitutes, we would obtain
Pi =  S12p 2 (2)
where S i2 is the exchange rate between the two countries, defined as in the 
earlier section, so S12P2 would represent the selling price in country 2 in 
terms of country l ’s currency. As the two goods are assumed perfect or 
close substitutes we have suppressed the labels for A and B. As the same 
consideration holds for all tradeable items between the two countries a sim­
ilar equation could be justified for all of them. Hence, if we further assume 
that the weights used in compiling each country’s domestic price indices are 
identical, then the above equation would continue to hold, where Pi and 
P2 now represent the respective price indices in the two countries. This re­
sult amounts to the following proposition; the general level of prices, when 
converted to a common currency, will be the same in every country. This 
assertion is usually referred to as the doctrine of purchasing power parity 
(PPP), in its absolute form. It was assumed in the above derivation that 
transaction costs were negligible. This is justified in the economic literature 
in a number of ways. Firstly, for many individual products it may well be 
that transport and other transaction costs are small enough, relative to sell­
ing prices, to be ignored for practical purposes. Secondly, even if transaction 
costs are not negligible, it may be argued that they vary, at least approx­
imately, in proportion to the value of the goods in question. For instance, 
tariffs, which are charges imposed by one country on the imports of another, 
are often charged ad valorem. The transportation costs of some products are 
frequently related to the value of goods shipped, and items like insurance 
premiums will almost invariably bear some relation to the unit selling price.
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If it is assumed that all such costs are proportional to price, then the appli­
cation of the law of one price to trade in our two products A and J5, would 
result in the following modified relationship
P\ =  kS^Pi
where A; is a positive constant. If this proportional increase for transaction 
costs is similar for all products, then this equation would continue to apply 
when we aggregate over all tradeable goods. Under these circumstances, 
transaction costs have the same effect as a once-over rescaling of prices. The 
functional form of the relationship between prices, as predicted by PPP, is 
therefore preserved. Finally, if neither of the above assumptions is acceptable, 
it may be postulated that absolute PPP, or some variation of it, holds only 
in the long term, with deviations allowed in the short term. This is one of 
the assumptions in the formulation of the price inertia model which will be 
discussed in a later chapter.
Reliance upon the international application of the law of one price is not 
however the only justification for the doctrine of PPP. Copeland (1994), gives 
an alternative, macroeconomic approach. Suppose, instead of the prices of 
individual goods and services being equated internationally, it is the general 
price levels themselves which are considered. Let us assume that each na­
tional price level is determined by that country’s macroeconomic policy, in 
much the same way it would be if the country was not engaged in interna­
tional trade. Then, given these independently determined price levels, the 
exchange rate is postulated to move in such a way as to satisfy the PPP 
relationship. One reason why this might occur, could be that the pressures 
from international trade might encourage similar costs of production between 
countries, at least in some overall sense. Taking the general level of prices as 
a measure of the costs of production in the country, we could compare the 
costs in another country with our own, by adjusting their price index by the 
exchange rate. If those costs of production are the same then it follows that 
the PPP relationship holds.
If the above argument is correct, then a number of consequences follow. 
Firstly, the argument amounts to an assertion that the exchange rate is 
determined by the following equation
Pi{t) =  S1 2WP2 W, (3)
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where Pi and P2 are indices of the general level of prices in the two countries. 
This, as will be described in later chapters, is one of the main assumptions 
behind the so called monetary model.
Secondly, it follows that this scenario presupposes a floating exchange 
rate. In periods when the exchange rate is fixed, either PPP fails to hold, 
or at least the mechanism inducing the relationship between the variables is 
assumed to function in a different way.
Thirdly, in principle at least, this approach does not rely on the law of one 
price. However, it might still apply in a sense, even if there were wide diver­
gences between countries in the price of individual goods and services. For 
instance, there may well be forces generating a broad equality between the 
cost of living (as measured by domestic price indices) in different countries. 
With this interpretation, we would not require equally weighted price indices, 
but it would now require that if there was a good which was overpriced (rel­
ative to that expected from PPP) which contributed say 1% to the weight of 
the domestic price index, then there would be another good, or goods, which 
were underpriced, and also contributed 1% to the index. Such requirements 
may seem unlikely, and, not surprisingly, the evidence for PPP holding on a 
continuous basis is not very convincing. Indeed, testing PPP in its absolute 
form is not easy. In particular, all published price indices have shortcomings, 
some theoretical because of their method of construction, and others relating 
to how well in practise, a particular index represents the overall level of prices 
as required in this context. It may be therefore, that the PPP relationship 
is valid but only with the ‘true’ price level variables which are unobservable, 
and only distantly related to what we actually observe using the published 
price indices.
As we have seen, if PPP could be relied upon to obtain at all times, 
competitiveness as measured in this way, would not only be constant, it would 
in some sense be equalised across different countries. No country would have 
a price advantage over another, at least in terms of the broad spread of goods 
and services represented by the general price level. As possible deviations 
from PPP play an important role in developing exchange rate models it will 
be useful to have a means of measuring such movements. The usual way of 
doing this, is through the concept of the so called real exchange rate, defined 
as follows. The real exchange rate, Q, is the price of foreign relative to 
domestic goods and services. It is calculated as
12
g ( t )  =  M £ ( 2  (4)
where Pi and P2 are indices of the general level of prices in the two countries. 
If PPP held, then as noted above, the countries involved can be considered 
to be equally competitive. Deviations of the real exchange rate from unity 
are therefore measures of relative international competitiveness between the 
countries. For instance, values of Q less than 1, imply that country 2 has a 
competitive edge over country 1, at least in terms of the price of its goods, 
taken as a whole. Similarly, if Q is greater than 1, then country 1 can be 
considered to have the price advantage when selling goods.
1.3 Uncovered interest rate parity
The uncovered interest rate parity condition plays a major role in many mod­
els of exchange rate movements. Some detailed consideration of its derivation 
is therefore well justified. We shall suppose that an investor wishes to pur­
chase a standard security for a fixed period, at the end of which they will 
receive interest on that investment. For convenience, we shall take the pe­
riod of investment to be a year although the argument is readily adapted to 
shorter periods with the same results. We shall be concerned with the alter­
natives open to an investor, with a stock of wealth in liquid form available for 
such investments. In particular, the choices we shall be concerned with, will 
be between a deposit in a domestic bank, or similar institution, and deposits 
in a foreign bank. It shall be assumed that there is a perfect flow of capital 
between countries, that is, no barriers to international transfers. This in fact 
is fairly realistic as far as today’s currency markets are concerned, at least 
for the developed world. We shall also assume that our investor is exempt 
from all taxes that might affect the choice of where to make a deposit.
Suppose that an investor has the opportunity to deposit 1 unit of do­
mestic currency in a bank within his own country. At the end of a year he 
receives interest equal to the domestic going rate, denoted by r\(assumed 
constant over the period) So at the end of the period, the investment will 
have ‘grown’ to
1 +
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Alternatively, the investor has the opportunity to invest his 1 unit of cur­
rency in a foreign country (country 2). If the current exchange rate between 
the two countries is S u 7 as defined in Section 1.1., then 1 unit of domestic 
currency will be worth 1 / S12 units of currency in the foreign country. That is, 
if we assume that it is not possible to make a profit by converting money into 
another currency and back again, no-arbitrage considerations ensure that
Sn  =  (5)
*J12
Hence, if the same amount of domestic currency is invested in the foreign 
country at an interest rate of r2 (also assumed constant over the period), 
then at the end of the period, the investment will have ‘grown’ to
1 + r 2 
£ 1 2
in terms of country 2’s currency. In order to compare the two investments, 
this return must be converted back in to units of domestic currency. At the 
beginning of the investment period it is not known what the exchange rate 
will be at the end of the period. So in order to enable a comparison to be 
made let us assume that our investor anticipates that by the end of the 
period the exchange rate will be S*2 (the forecast being made at the start of 
the period of course). Therefore, the anticipated return on this investment, 
in domestic currency will be
(1 +  r2)6,f2
£ 1 2
Now before comparing these two investment opportunities, we need to 
consider the risk involved with both investments. The investment in the 
domestic bank has no financial risk involved. It requires no forecasting of the 
exchange rate, or possible changes to the policy of a free movement in capital 
etc. which may change before the end of the period. The investment in the 
foreign country does involve these extra unknowns however, and so is far 
from riskless. In order to consider the possible effect of this on the investment 
strategy, we shall introduce the following concept. The risk prem ium  is the
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reward, usually in the form of an anticipated excess return, that an economic 
agent (investor) gets in order to persuade him to bear risk.
Why do agents usually require an incentive in order to undertake risky 
projects? Economic theory assumes that for the most part, individuals prefer 
riskless to risky investments, other things being equal. This feature of pref­
erences is what explains why risky investments usually yield a higher return 
than riskless ones. Not that this is always true. There are instances when 
agents seem content to run risks for no reward, or even in some cases to pay 
for the privilege of bearing risk. Therefore, when considering the returns 
from investments in differing countries it will be important to make clear 
the assumptions being made about the attitude of agents. As such we make 
the following definition. R isk averters are economic agents who require a 
(positive) risk premium in order to persuade them to hold risky assets. By 
contrast, risk lovers are willing to pay a premium for the privilege of bear­
ing risk, while risk neutral agents are willing to do so in return for a zero 
risk premium.
Let us assume that economic agents are risk neutral. In general, then, 
for equilibrium (that is a situation where there is, on balance, no tendency 
for funds to move into or out of the domestic economy) we require that the 
return from depositing 1 unit of currency in a domestic bank, be just equal 
to the return from depositing the same amount (also in domestic currency ) 
in the foreign bank. Hence we have
(l +  r1) = (1+ ; 2)^ . (6)
012
Suppose we let A S*2 represent the anticipated rate of depreciation, defined 
as follows.
AS?, =  Sn'12 r»u12
where the time interval in this case is one year. Rearranging this equation 
gives
c°
° 1 2 = 1 + (7)•J12
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Using this relationship in equation (6) for the returns in the two countries, 
gives
( l  +  Ti) =  1 + T 2  +  AjS^ +  r2AS*2.
Now the cross-product term ^ A S ^ , is made up of two rates; the rate of 
interest and the anticipated rate of depreciation of the currency. Provided 
the latter is not exorbitant (for example hyperinflation) this cross-product 
term will be of the second order, and can therefore be ignored. On so doing, 
we would have
A S?2 =  n  -  r2. (8)
This result is known as the U ncovered Interest R ate P arity  condition  
(U IP ). In words it may be stated as; the domestic interest rate must be 
higher (lower) than the foreign interest rate by gin amount equal to the an­
ticipated depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic currency.
Although the above relationship was derived on the assumption that the 
investment period was for a year, the same argument can be applied to any 
period of time. In particular, as the period of time At —► 0, we obtain
f $ )  =  r i W  " r2(t)  (9)
where the left hand side of the above equation now represents the antici­
pated instantaneous rate of change in the exchange rate. If s12 represents 
the natural log of the exchange rate, then using the standard result for the 
differential of the log of a variable, the above relationship can be written as
^(S12) _ / 1 A \—  = n - r 2 (10)
which is the form in which it is often encountered in standard texts. It is
also worth noting that it is not difficult to show that the foregoing relation­
ship holds exactly, rather than approximately, if interest is assumed to be 
compounded continuously.
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In many standard texts, what we have referred to as the anticipated 
rate of change, is often called the expected rate of change. This implies 
that the markets anticipated change in the exchange rate is equal to the 
expected value of the change in a random variable, usually taken to be the 
actual exchange rate However, this step does require further assumptions, 
and at this stage is not required for a basic statement of UIP. Although 
the assumption of UIP is quite plausible the evidence for it holding is not 
overwhelming. This is partly due to the difficulty of testing any hypothesis 
about UIP independently from that of how the markets anticipated change 
in the exchange rate is formed. However, McCallum (1994) claims that the 
current evidence can be interpreted as being at least not inconsistent with 
UIP. Whatever the evidence, UIP remains a central assumption in many 
exchange rate models.
1.4 The goods sector in th e open econom y
In an open economy (that is, one which engages in international trade) the 
planned aggregate demand for goods and services in a given period is equal to 
those goods and services which are used within the country plus net exports 
to other countries. This is usually expressed as follows
planned demand =  C +  I  +  G-\ -B  (11)
where C and I  are the expenditure on consumption and investment, respec­
tively, G is net government purchases of goods and services, and B  is the 
excess of the country’s exports over its imports. Here, all the components 
are measured in volume, that is real money terms. We may ask what factors 
will influence these components of aggregate demand. As far as consumption 
is concerned, an individual household’s consumption is likely to increase as 
its own income rises. Aggregating across all households therefore, it seems 
reasonable to assume that other things being equal, total private sector con­
sumption will depend positively on the volume of national income in the 
period, Y. Conversely, the higher the level of domestic interest rates, the 
more the incentive is to save rather than to consume. Household consump­
tion therefore, can be assumed to be negatively related to the level of interest 
rates, r.
Investment spending, is assumed to be primarily that undertaken by the 
corporate sector, although similar considerations would apply to investment
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decisions in other sectors of the economy. Investment spending by the corpo­
rate sector will depend on a comparison of the cost of funds for the purchase 
of equipment and similar items, with the profits to be expected from the in­
vestment. Although this will involve many factors and uncertainties, based 
upon elementary economic considerations at least one conclusion seems firm. 
That is, other things being equal, the higher the interest rate in the econ­
omy, the greater the cost of capital, and hence the less likely it is that any 
given prospective investment will appear profitable to the decision maker. 
In general therefore, aggregate investment will also be negatively related to 
interest rates.
Government spending will be taken as exogenously given. That is, its 
level is considered to be determined outside the model by political and other 
factors. Its level is not necessarily constant, but can be taken as given, from 
a mathematical viewpoint, at any point in time.
Finally, one of the major factors the level of net exports for a country will 
depend upon is its relative competitiveness compared to other countries. Now 
as noted in the Section 1.2, relative competitiveness can be measured by Q, 
the real exchange rate. The higher the level of Q, the greater the competitive 
edge the domestic country has in terms of prices. In other words, the higher 
Q, the greater will be the domestic country’s exports and smaller its imports. 
Hence, the level of net exports can be considered to be positively related to 
the real exchange rate. Of course, the real exchange rate is generally changing 
all the time, so either we must consider that it is the average real exchange 
rate (or some similar measure) over the period which is relevant, or that 
the period of time under consideration is sufficiently small to be of the same 
magnitude as the periods in which changes to Q are measured. The net level 
of exports may depend upon other factors in addition to the real exchange 
rate. In particular, exports are likely to depend upon the level of national 
output in the foreign countries. The higher their national output, the greater 
is likely to be their propensity to import goods, all other things remaining 
constant. However, for the time being we shall assume that either these 
factors are relatively unimportant compared with the real exchange rate, or 
at least their movements are likely to be relatively small over the periods we 
are considering.
Lastly, as in the standard texts on the topic, we may assume for simplicity 
that the dependency of aggregate demand on all components is linear, or 
more precisely, that the relationship can be adequately represented by the 
first term of its Taylor expansion. Therefore, taking all the above, postulated
18
dependencies in to account, implies the following relationship for aggregate 
demand in the domestic country
planned demand =  8{Y  — +  G\ +  r^ 12^ 2^ 2 (1 2 )
where <5i, r)1 and 7]u  are positive parameters. In addition, <5i < 1, since total 
personal sector consumption of domestic goods and services cannot exceed 
their production, as measured by national income. In the above derivation, 
international trade has been assumed to take place with just one other coun­
try. An alternative interpretation could be that this represents net trade with 
the rest of the world in which case S12 and P2 would represent some form of 
average exchange rate and price index. In theory, there are many possible 
candidates for what should be used to measure the level of domestic inter­
est rates r; bond yields, returns on shares etc. However, as Copeland(1994) 
points out, in practise the returns on different assets are highly correlated, so 
it is enough to choose one interest rate, such as the yield on Treasury Bills, 
and use that as the interest rate for these discussions.
Now equilibrium in the goods market is defined to mean equality between 
planned aggregate demand and the aggregate supply of goods and services 
in the economy, over the period of time. Aggregate supply can be taken as 
synonymous with the national income generated by the production and sale 
of those goods and services, that is actual demand Y. Equilibrium in the 
goods market is therefore equivalent to the condition
actual demand =  planned demand.
Therefore, substituting for the relationship for planned demand derived 
in equation (12) we obtain the following
Y  =  61Y ~ l l r +  G 1 +  ^nS^ P\  (13)
PI
Rearranging equation (13), we obtain
PlY  +  7 lr -  =  Gl (1 4 )
n
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where j31 =  l  — S\. This relationship is usually referred to as the IS equation 
in standard economic texts. In most exchange rate models utilising the IS 
relationship or the theory of aggregate demand from which it is derived, the 
equations are given in log-linear form. Hence, the IS relationship is usually 
expressed as follows
P\V +  7 ir -  +  V2 ~  Pi) =  91 (15)
where all variables, except the interest rate, are now in natural logs. The 
theoretical justification for this form does not seem much stronger than that 
for a straightforward linear relationship. However, it does have the advantage 
of being simpler to handle mathematically in many exchange rate models, 
which no doubt explains its widespread use.
1.5 The m oney sector in the open econom y
By holding a proportion of their wealth in the form of money, people are able 
to enjoy considerable economic advantages. These advantages include near- 
universal acceptability, easy conversion in to other assets and low transaction 
costs with its use. It follows that the greater their money balances, the more 
benefit from these advantages they enjoy. The less they hold, the more 
frequently they have to realize other assets such as stocks or bonds, so as to 
pay for transactions. The holding of wealth in the form of money is therefore 
always a desirable property, other things being equal. However, other forms 
of assets while not enjoying the same advantages as money, or at least to the 
same degree, do have the counter-attraction of a return which may take the 
form of interest on saving deposits, yields on bonds, dividends on shares etc. 
Hence, the relationship governing the demand for money is usually explained 
along the fines of the following arguments.
It is assumed that, other things being equal, the more transactions there 
are in a country in a given period of time, the greater will be peoples’ de­
mand for money in order to carry out those transactions. For these purposes, 
transactions can be considered as any activity where money changes hands 
for goods and services. Suppose that the structure of the economy is fairly 
stable over some period. Then it might be assumed that the volume of trans­
actions bears some stable relationship to the level of economic activity in the 
economy, which in turn might be measured by aggregate national income.
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In addition, it may be assumed in such a period, that the relationship be­
tween the demand for money and the number of transactions is also constant. 
Therefore, if we ignore the effect that returns from holding other forms of 
assets will have for the present, the demand for money, Md, may be assumed 
to be related to national income in money terms, W y as follows
M d =  IW, I >  0. (16)
In this relationship, both money demand and national income are in nom­
inal, that is money terms. Now the volume of a variable such as national 
income, is defined to mean the value of that variable in money terms, de­
flated by a relevant price index. In this case therefore, since we have already 
denoted the volume of national output by Y, and the index of overall prices 
in an economy by P , (neglecting subscripts, as we are dealing with a single 
economy at present) we must have
W  =  PY. (17)
Substituting for this in the equation for money demand and rearranging, we 
therefore obtain
M d
■p = l Y ■
The quantity M d/ P  is referred to as th e dem and for real m oney  
balances, and the relationship itself as the Cambridge quantity equation. 
However, as already indicated, the demand for money is likely to depend 
not only on the level of transactions for goods but also on the proportion of 
wealth held in assets other than money. In particular, the higher the return 
from assets such as bonds and shares, the greater will be the demand to hold 
wealth in these types of assets rather than as money. Hence, assuming a 
linear relationship, the equation for real money balances can be modified as 
follows
M d
—  =  l Y - k r  (18)
I, k >  0.
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where as in Section 1.4, r is a typical measure of domestic interest rates.
In line with most standard economic texts, the above derivation assumes 
that it is real money balances which is a linear function of domestic interest 
rates. However, the justification for this is not overpowering and in Chapter 
3 we explore the effect of formulating this relationship rather differently.
Let M s denote the supply of money in nominal terms. Then equilibrium 
exists in the money market when demand is equal to supply. When that 
happens we must have
M3
—  =  IY -  At . (19)
This result is known as the LM equation, and effectively defines combinations 
of national income and interest rates consistent with equilibrium in money 
markets for given levels of money supply and prices. As with the IS equation 
discussed earlier, in most applications of the LM relationship to the mod­
elling of exchange rates, the equation is usually reformulated as a log-linear 
equation. The relationship then takes the form
m — p =  ly — kr (20)
where lower case letters denote the natural logs of variables (except interest 
rates) and I and k are positive parameters as before. The superscript on m  
! is usually dropped as in equilibrium, money demand equals money supply. 
As in the formulation of the IS equation, the use of a log-linear relationship 
usually simplifies its incorporation in to an exchange rate model.
One final point of interest is that M, P  and r are all variables which can
be measured at a given point in time t. However, national income Y,  is
by definition, a quantity which only has meaning over an interval of time. 
Therefore, it may be better to think of Y  as the annual national income, 
if the current, instantaneous, level of output was maintained. The same 
observation does of course apply to the consideration of the IS equation in 
Section 1.4.
1.6 The supply side
In Section 1.4, the factors which influence the demand for goods and services 
were considered. When the demand for these items was in equilibrium with
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supply, the so called IS relationship was defined. In this Section we look 
at the factors and assumptions which affect the supply of those goods and 
services. As a starting point, we shall assume that the quantity of equipment, 
plant and other non-labour factors of production in a country are fixed, or 
at least are changing slowly over the timescales we are considering. In other 
words, it is assumed that output depends only on the manpower employed.
In the first scenario, we shall assume that prices, including wage rates, 
in an economy, are perfectly flexible. That is, they respond instantly to any 
factors which might influence them, especially the willingness and ability of 
employers to vary wage rates. The effect of a price rise in this situation 
is described in detail by Copeland (1994), of which the following are the 
essentials. Suppose the supply side of the economy is in equilibrium, in the 
sense that at a given level of prices, there will be a wage level at which the 
supply of labour is just equal to that demanded by employers. At this level, 
there will be a certain number of people employed producing a level of output 
related to this number. If now prices suddenly change by a given percentage, 
due to changes in demand for products for instance, then all other things 
being equal, employers will be willing to pay wages which are higher by the 
same percentage, at any particular level of output. In order for employees to 
maintain the same relationship between consumption and leisure time, they 
would also need wages to be increased by the same percentage at any given 
level of employment. The upshot of all this is that the demand and the supply 
of labour will be in equilibrium again if wages rise by the same percentage as 
prices. What is more, the number of people employed, and the related level of 
output at the new equilibrium point, will be exactly the same as before. The 
only thing that has changed is that both prices and wages have increased or 
decreased by the same percentage. This result maybe summarised as follows. 
W ith the assumption of flexible prices, the aggregate supply curve is vertical 
at the long-run capacity output level of the economy, often referred to as 
the natural level o f output. This is because, as the price level fluctuates 
up or down, the money wage adjusts to keep the real wage constant. Hence, 
employment and output never vary, and the price level itself is determined by 
aggregate demand. The supply curve under these assumptions is referred to 
as C lassical. These results will be important in the discussion of the flexible 
price monetary model in Section 2.1.
In the next scenario, we shall assume that money wages can not change. 
This might arise because money wages are fixed, at least in the medium 
time horizon, by employment contracts. In many cases the contract might be
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negotiated between employers and trade unions, in which case the mechanism 
for adjusting money wages could be quite time consuming. In this situation, 
faced with an increase in prices, due to increased demand, employers will 
wish to take on more labour in order to meet the extra demand at this higher 
price. It is assumed that workers will willingly supply more labour at the 
current rate, either because it is uncertain how temporary the extra demand 
will be, or because of the inertia in the wage negotiating mechanism already 
mentioned. The effect will be to increase both the level of employment and 
the associated level of output: while real wages fall. In other words, an 
increase in prices results in an increase in output, that is, a so called upward- 
sloping supply curve. As part of this scenario, it was assumed that prices had 
risen because of increased demand. In practise, if wages formed the biggest 
part of employers’ costs, or if non-labour costs were constant, then faced 
with an increase in demand, rather than increase its prices, a competitive 
firm would prefer to maintain its prices (in order not to lose market share) 
and simply increase production at the fixed money wage. In the extreme 
limit of this scenario, therefore, all prices, whether wages or selling prices, 
are constant, and supply is determined by demand. This is known as a 
K eynesian supply curve.
It may be argued that the flexible wage assumption is an implausible 
description of the labour market in the short term, while the fixed wage 
alternative is equally unrealistic as a description of the longer term behaviour 
of an economy. Consider therefore a compromise between the two extremes. 
According to this scenario, an increase in the demand for goods and services 
will result, initially, in a rise in employment and output, in order to meet 
that extra demand. Workers would be willing to supply more labour at the 
initial wage rate because of existing contracts or the other factors mentioned 
earlier. The selling prices of goods are also unaffected in this phase. As time 
passes, contracts are renegotiated, and money wages are progressively bid up 
in response to the extra demand for labour. In turn, firms try to recoup the 
rise in labour costs by raising selling prices, which itself gives further impetus 
to the increase in wage rates. More importantly, the increased selling prices 
will tend to reduce demand again, so output now starts to fall; at each stage 
short term supply meeting demand. The process continues until output is 
back at its natural level, but with selling prices higher than before and with 
wage rates increased by the same percentage as prices. The final position 
therefore being that predicted by the classical supply assumptions. This 
scenario, or some variation of it, is that assumed by the price inertia models
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of exchange rate dynamics.
1.7 Summary
In this Chapter the basic macroeconomic framework for countries operating 
in an international trading environment has been formulated. The goods 
and money sectors of the economy were discussed and, in particular, the 
circumstances when equilibrium exists in these markets. In addition, the 
two important concepts of purchasing power parity and uncovered interest 
rate parity were introduced. W ith this framework in place, we are now in a 
position to formulate the two major dynamic models of exchange rate move­
ments. Section 2.1 considers the deterministic monetary model, and Section 
2.2 formulates the deterministic price inertia model in one of its most general 
terms. The Chapter then goes on to consider the important overshooting ef­
fect of the price inertia model, and for the situation of a fixed short term 
supply of goods in a country, obtains an explicit relationship for how the ex­
change rate moves with time. The Chapter concludes by considering for the 
same model, the restrictions on macroeconomic parameters that are implied 
if exchange rates are to fullfil no-arbitrage conditions in networks consisting 
of more than two countries.
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2 The m onetary and price inertia m odels
2.1 The monetary m odel
2.1.1 Tw o countries
The flexible price monetary model was developed by Frenkel (1976), Mussa 
(1976) and Bilson (1978) .The monetary model rests essentially on the fol­
lowing assumptions. Firstly, the aggregate supply curve is assumed vertical. 
As noted in Section 1.6, this does not imply that output is fixed in the long 
term, simply that it can only vary as the result of a change in the produc­
tivity of the economy. That is, through technical progress, the accumulation 
of capital, growth in the labour force or its educational level, and changes
in related factors. Again as noted in Section 1.6, a vertical supply curve
presupposes perfect price flexibility in all markets.
Secondly, money supply and demand are assumed to be equal when there 
is equilibrium in the money market. In addition, the demand for real money 
balances is assumed to depend upon domestic real income and interest rates, 
in a conventional manner. Hence, the money demand function for country 
i, in log- linear form can, as indicated by equation (20) in Section 1.5, be 
written as follows
r r ii-p i =  Uyi -  (2 1 )
where rrii is money supply, Pi is the price level, y, is domestic real output, 
and r* is the interest rate. All variables except the interest rate are measured 
in logs.
Thirdly, purchasing power parity in absolute form, PPP, is assumed to 
hold at all times. As in Section 1.2, this means that in log form, the exchange 
rate between countries 1 and 2, is related to the domestic price level in those 
countries as follows
512 =  P i-P 2  (22)
where s12 is the logarithm of the exchange rate between the two countries, 
and pi is the logarithm of the price level in country i.
Substituting for pi and p2 in the PPP relationship from the respective 
money demand relationships given in equation (21), gives
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Si2 =  m i  -  m 2 +  h y i  -  k y 2 +  h r i  -  k 2r 2. (23)
In most formulations of this model, the macroeconomic parameters in the 
two countries are assumed identical, particularly the semi-elasticity on in­
terest rates, k{. This enables further assumptions about the components of 
the interest rate, and the differential in the rates, to be incorporated in to 
the model. For instance, Pilbeam(1992), Chapter 7.8, assumes that the in­
terest rate is equal to an underlying ‘real’ rate of interest, plus the market’s 
anticipated rate of price inflation.
In this monetary model, a sudden increase in a variable such as the money 
supply in country 1, would generate an immediate excess demand for goods 
in that country. As real output cannot exceed 2/1, until productivity levels 
change, this in turn leads to inflation. The price level therefore rises imme­
diately in order to keep money supply and demand in equilibrium, thereby 
choking-off the excess demand for goods. At the same time, the exchange 
rate depreciates, and in so doing maintains purchasing power parity.
Of course, in the above description, nothing has been said about the 
effects, if any, on interest rates. In practice, interest rate differentials can­
not be arbitrary. In particular, if we assume that the uncovered interest 
rate parity (UIP) condition holds in asset markets, then the interest rate 
differential must be equal to the market’s anticipated rate of change in the 
exchange rate. The value of the exchange rate is therefore subject to a form 
of feedback mechanism, and will be dependent upon the exact form of that 
mechanism. In the following section, some possible alternatives for how the 
market’s anticipations are formed will be discussed. If in addition, rational 
exp ectation s are assumed to hold in the market, (see Section 2.2.1 for more 
details) then the market’s anticipated value of the exchange rate will be, on 
average, be equal to the actual exchange rate. We shall make use of this 
approach, when discussing the stochastic version of the monetary model, in 
Section 4.1.
2.1.2  M ore than  tw o countries
As we have already seen from equation (5), in order that there can be no 
arbitrage by converting one currency in to another and then back again, for
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any pair of countries we must have
w r - z M -  <m>
This may be written in the following, alternative form
S»(t)Sfi(t) =  1. (25)
Suppose that we have a number of countries at least some of which are linked 
through international trade and so there exists an exchange rate between 
them. We can consider the countries as the vertices of a graph. A pair ij of 
countries is an edge of the graph if the exchange rate S{j(t) is defined. If every 
pair of countries is linked by an exchange rate, then the graph is com plete. 
In general, we do not assume that the graph is complete, although we do 
assume that it is connected: that is, any given country can be reached from 
any other country by a sequence of links (edges of the graph). Consider any 
cycle in the graph, comprising the countries arbitrarily labelled, i, j ,  • • • , I. It 
will be assumed that it is not possible to make a profit or loss by a sequence 
of exchanges around the cycle. This can be viewed as an extension of the 
previous no-arbitrage relationship, and is usually referred to as the cyclic  
no-arbitrage condition. The restriction on the exchange rates becomes
Sij(t)Sjk( t) - - -S li(t) =  1. (26)
Taking natural logarithms leads to the corresponding result
Sij(t) +  Sjk(t) -+•••• +  su(t) =  0. (27)
The justification for this assumption is that currency exchanges operate 
so rapidly and with so little cost (for the major players) that any deviation 
cannot persist for more than a few moments. In the past, this was not always 
true.
Suppose for simplicity that we have a network of just three countries, all 
of which are connected by exchange rates. Assuming that exchange rate are 
determined by the flexible price monetary model, then the rate between any 
pair of countries i , j  will be given as follows
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Sij =  r r i i -  m j  +  k y i  ~  IjVj +  h n  -  kjTj. (28)
The cyclic no-arbitrage condition would require that
S 12 ■+■ S23 +  S31 =  0 - (29)
It is straightforwsird to check that with the foregoing model, the cyclic no­
arbitrage condition will be met for all time t. In addition, it can be seen 
that the argument is readily extended to cycles consisting of any number of 
countries within a network.
2.2 The price inertia m odel
2.2.1 Tw o countries
The assumption of flexible prices in the monetary model has, as noted ear­
lier, some important consequences. In particular, short term supply and long 
term supply, are constant at the full employment level of the economy. Any 
excess demand pressures are translated immediately in to price rises which 
remove the excess demand. In addition, as purchasing power parity (PPP) is 
assumed to hold continuously, the exchange rate between the two countries 
.is determined by the relative price levels at any point in time. An influential 
study by Meese and Rogoff (1983), and other empirical evidence, indicated 
that the observed variability of actual exchange rates was much greater than 
might be expected from that predicted by the monetary model after recorded 
changes in the variables upon which it depends, that is the so called funda­
mentals of the model. In addition, as noted by Copeland (1994, p76) the 
assumption of PPP holding continuously does not seem to agree with the 
observed facts, at least in the industrialised countries.
In order to explain some of these observations, Dombusch (1976) devel­
oped a model which emphasised the stickiness of prices in product mar­
kets. This model, in its short-rim features, fits in to the Keynesian tradition, 
with prices having considerable inertia to movement. On the other hand, it 
displays some of the long-run characteristics of the flexible price monetary 
model. In particular, the long-run value of the real exchange rate remains un­
changed, provided national outputs and government expenditures remain un­
altered. In addition, as prices can no longer adjust immediately, any changes
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to variables such as money supply result in changes to interest rates in order 
to maintain equilibrium in money markets. As the UIP condition is still as­
sumed to hold in asset markets, there will be a corresponding movement by 
the exchange rate to a new equilibrium level. A consequence of the model 
is that the exchange rate jumps immediately on a change in money supply, 
but further than the new equilibrium level (at least for certain combinations 
of parameters), the so called over-shooting effect. A number of variations 
of the basic model discussed by Dornbusch have been proposed, but all of 
these variations will be referred to under the general heading of price inertia 
models.
As already noted, there are many descriptions of the price inertia model, 
but the variation discussed below is probably one of the most general formu­
lations, and is based on the principles outlined by Gartner(1993). However, 
Gartner formulates the model in terms of one country verses the rest of the 
world. The approach here, considers the interaction between two countries of 
comparable economic size, and therefore includes aspects of the formulation 
by Baillie and McMahon(1994). As in the monetary model, we assume that 
money supply in country i is equal to money demand; both of which will be 
represented by m*. In addition, money demand is assumed to be given by 
the standard LM equation in log-linear form, as shown below
m i— pi =  Uyi -  k^ i, (30)
where m*, pi} and are functions of time, defined as in Section 1.5.
In the goods sector, equilibrium will be assumed to be determined by 
a standard IS equation in log-linear form. Assuming that trade is possible 
between two countries, then as in Chapter 1, s12 will represent the natural 
log of the (spot) exchange rate between them, with country 1 being taken as 
the domestic country. Then as shown in equation (15) the IS equation for 
country 1 can be written as follows
P\V\ +  7 iri =  Si +  Vnisn  -  Pi + p 2), (31)
where the quantities involved are as defined in Chapter 1. The IS equation 
for country 2 can be written similarly
PiVi +  72r2 =  92 +  r)21(s2i -  P2 +  Pi). (32)
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As noted in Chapter 1, if the goods market is assumed to be in continuous 
equilibrium as represented by the IS equation, then this implies that the 
demand for goods is in equilibrium with short term supply, although not 
necessarily with the long term supply level; see Section 1.6.
In Section 1.3, equation (5), arbitrage considerations required that S21 — 
1 /$ 12} which in terms of the logarithm of the exchange rate, is equivalent 
to S21 =  — $i2 - Therefore, the IS equation for country 2 can be written as 
follows
@2V2 +  7 2 r 2 = 9 2 -  V2i(sn - P 1 +  P 2 ). (33)
Prices are assumed to change in proportion to (in log-linear form) the
difference between the demand for goods, yd, and the long term, natural
level of supply, when prices fire assumed once again to be stable. That is
~  =  4 > M  -  Vi) (3 4 )
where y{ denotes the natural level of output in country z, yf the demand 
for goods and services at time £, and pi the price level in country i at time 
t. All variables being measured in natural logs. The parameter (f)i governs 
the rate at which prices adjust. For the present, we shall assume short term 
equilibrium exists in the goods market, so demand equates with national 
output. That is z/f =  z/j.
P roposition  1 With the above assumptions, the rate of change of the price 
differential satisfies the differential equation
Proof
Solving the LM and IS equations for the level of output and interest rates 
which maintain equilibrium in both the money and goods sectors, gives for 
country 1,
2/1 =  "a  u  l  i — ( fci P i + M i 2 ( s u - P i + P 2 ) + 7 i n » i - 7 i P i )  ( 3 5 )p  j/Ci +
7-1 = a u \ i —  + h r ) n  (S12 -  P i  + P i )  -  ftmj + /?jPi).Pi^i +  (i7!
Similarly, the levels of output and interest rates which maintain equilibrium 
in the money and goods sectors in country 2 are
2/2 =  ~n"~i T~y—  (92h -  k2rj21 (S12 -  Pi +  p 2) +  72m2 -  72P2) (36)
P 2 k  2 + £272
1
r 2 = a  u" ---- (92I2 -  I2V21 ( S 12 -  P i  + P 2 )  -  (32m 2 + P 2 V 2 ) .P2k2 +  £272
Suppose we define Pi2 as the ratio of the price indices in countries 1 and 
2, so
P a =  § •  (3V)
Then upon taking logs we have
P12 = P i ~  P i -
Differentiating p\2 with respect to time, and substituting for the rates of the 
individual price adjustments, we have
^  =  4>i{vi -  2/1) -  M v t  -  Vi)- (38)
As we are assuming that short term output is equal to demand, we can substi­
tute for 2/1 and y2l from equations (35) and (36), which describe equilibrium 
in the money and goods sectors in the respective countries.
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Upon doing so and rearranging, we obtain
( ------- ~ ---------- 1---------- ---^ (s 12 — P 12) — 0 1 2/l +  02^/2
\ P 1k 1 +  Zi7i £ 2*2 +  ^ 2 7 2 ; v ' 1 1  2 2
+ G ^ + ^ ; ) (fcigi+7imi~ 7iPi) (39)
□
The other relevant consideration which affects the dynamics of the system  
is the relative interest rates in the two countries. In Section 1.3, it was 
j shown that if the uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP) is assumed 
to hold then the markets anticipated rate of change in the exchange rate is 
approximately equal to the interest rate differential, that is
dpu,
dt
^(^12) _  _
dt 1 2'
As noted in Section 1.3, there are a range of possible assumptions for the 
precise way in which the market forms its view of the anticipated rate of 
change in the exchange rate and in particular how this relates to the exchange 
rate itself. A common assumption is that the market forms its view of the 
anticipated rate of change on the basis of the difference between the actual 
exchange rate at time t and an assumed long term equilibrium level of the 
rate. At this long term equilibrium, the exchange rate is usually presumed to 
be at rest, as are prices. For the time being however, all that is required is to 
assume that the anticipated rate of change is proportional, in log linear terms, 
to the difference between the exchange rate at time £, and some particular 
level, denoted by 6 1 2 - The assumption then is
■ =  - a ( s i 2 -  5 1 2 ) ol > 0. (40)at
On this assumption, the anticipated rate of change is greater the further 
the exchange rate is from S1 2 , and in the direction towards this level. This 
process is usually referred to as one of adaptive expectations.
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Another variation, is to assume that however the market comes to its 
view on the anticipated rate of change, its view is invariably correct. That 
is, the market’s anticipated rate of change at time t  is equal to the actual rate 
of change at time t. This is referred to as perfect foresight in, for example 
Gartner(1993), and Pilbeam(1992). The assumption is therefore
<*(*12) = dfcia) ( 4  v
dt dt
The assumption of perfect foresight asserts that there is complete certainty 
as to the movement in the exchange rate; it follows the market’s antici­
pated movement, however that may be formed. A possibly more realistic 
assumption is that the market’s anticipated change is correct, on average. 
This requires the concept of rational expectations, which may be defined as 
follows. The rational exp ectation s hypothesis states that the market’s 
anticipated value, made at time t, is equal to the mathematical expected 
value of the variable in question, conditional on the set of all available infor­
mation at time t. Hence, considering future values of the exchange rate to be 
random variables, the rational expectations hypothesis would maintain that 
the market’s anticipated value for the rate at any time in the future, would 
be equal to the conditional expectation of the exchange rate for the same 
point in time. If investors are rational in forming their anticipations, they 
will often be wrong, in fact they may be wrong all of the time, but however 
large their errors, on average they will be correct. In real life it would be irra­
tional to employ any forecasting method which could be improved. Since any 
forecasting process that generates systematic errors can be improved upon by 
a method which exploits the pattern in the errors, the assumption that the 
rational expectations hypothesis applies to the market’s estimates of future 
values of the exchange rate is not without some merit. If this assumption 
holds then the market’s anticipated rate of change, made at time t, can be 
! written as follows
d(sn) =  E(dan )t . .
dt dt K 1
where the subscript £, indicates that all information up to and including time 
t, is assumed known. Most importantly, this implies that Si2 (t) is known. The 
use of rational expectations will be relevant to the discussion of stochastic
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models in Chapter 4, where the approach relies on the taking of expectations 
in order to derive ordinary differential equations which describe the system. 
Many standard texts, for example Pilbeam (1992), also assume the rational 
expectations hypothesis applies in this non-stochastic situation, or at least 
they use the term ‘market expectations’ in a very general, undefined sense. 
However, in most cases all that is required is the assumption that market 
anticipations are formed in a particular way, without the need to introduce 
the further assumption of rational expectations.
Conventionally, the system is assumed to start evolving following an un­
expected change in one of the variables such as the money supply in one of 
the countries. It is then assumed that prices and the exchange rate continue 
to adjust until output is once again at its long term natural level in the two 
countries. At this point, prices and the exchange rate axe also assumed to 
cease evolving. Assuming they exist, we may enquire what these limiting, 
or equilibrium values as they are conventionally referred to, for prices and 
the exchange rate would be. In order to obtain explicit answers to this ques­
tion we shall need to make some simplifying assumptions. In particular, we 
shall assume that the macroeconomic parameters in the two countries are 
identical. In this case, the following results are obtained.
P roposition  2  If the uncovered interest rate parity condition is assumed, 
the equilibrium price differential and exchange rate is given as follows
P12 — mi2 ~ t y u
,  , (/3 -  2 ? } % 1 2  01 2
$12 =  m i2---H------ ------------— ,
2r) 2  7?
where the subscripts on the macro-economic parameters have been dropped, 
as these are now assumed identical in both countries, and # I2 =  g\ — #2, with 
similar definitions for y12 and m12.
Proof
W ith the assumption of identical macroeconomic parameters in the two 
countries, the equation for the rate of change in the price differential simplifies 
to the following
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1 1
d t  =  fik \ iy  k^9n +  2kl} ^  ~  Pl^  +  lm n  ~  7Pl2  ^~  ^ 12' ^
When the system is in equilibrium, by definition prices cease to change. 
Hence, putting dp\2/d t =  0, and rearranging, we obtain
2krjsn  -  (2krj +  y)p12 =  (0k +  l l ) y 12 -  kg12 -  ^ml2. (44)
This equation effectively constrains the levels of the exchange rate and rela­
tive prices, in order that there is no inflation.
Taking the difference in the respective LM equations for the two countries 
gives
m 12 -  p12 =  ly12 — k(ri — r2). (45)
Assuming that the UIP condition holds continuously, therefore implies
m 12 -  pn  =  ly12 -  (46)
At equilibrium, the exchange rate ceases to change. Therefore, assuming a 
method of formation of market anticipations, such as adaptive expectations 
or perfect foresight, the market’s anticipated rate of change at equilibrium 
will also be zero. Alternatively, we could assume this to be the situation 
directly, as part of the definition of system equilibrium. In either case, at 
equilibrium it is implied that the two interest rates are equal. Hence at 
equilibrium we must have
Pn =  m n  ~ iVn (47)
since it is assumed that supply is back at its long term natural level at equi­
librium. This can be viewed as the new equilibrium price level. Substituting 
this for the equilibrium relative price in equation (44), we obtain
2krfs12 -  {2krj +  7 )(m i2  -  ly12) =  (/3k +  h ) y 12 -  kg12 -  7 m 12. (48)
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After simplifying, the following expression for the equilibrium exchange rate 
is obtained
, (ft ~  2 ?)0 2 /l2 gi2 /ilnNsn  =  m u  —---------- — . (49)
□
The precise path of the exchange rate, and in particular how it approaches 
the equilibrium value, depends upon the assumption of how market antic­
ipations are formed. In the original formulation by Dombusch, adaptive 
expectations are assumed, and this is still the case in the majority of texts. 
W ith this assumption, and with plausible values for the economic parame­
ters, the price inertia model exhibits the so called overshooting effect. The 
conditions imposed on the macroeconomic parameters for overshooting to 
occur are as follows.
P roposition  3 The ‘jum p’ in the exchange rate immediately following a 
change in relative money supply will be greater than that required to reach 
the new equilibrium level provided
/3 -  2r]l >  0.
Proof.
To see this, first of all recall equation (46) for the relationship for the 
difference in the two countries LM equations assuming that UIP holds;
7 Kd (S12)
m 12 ~  P n  = l y i z  ~  k t f ~ '
W ith the assumption of adaptive expectations, described in equation (40), 
we would then have
m n -  p i2 =  lyn  -  ka (s12 -  s12). (50)
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After substituting for the previously derived expressions for y\ and y2 in 
equations (35) and (36), we obtain
m i2 -p \2  =  ^ r x 7 -(% i2 +  2fc7?(s12-p i2 )4 -m 127 -7 P i2 )  (51)fjK +
+kasu  — kaisi2- 
Rearranging this equation and simplifying, gives
, a \  n snttkrt +  Pk +  h )  , gnl
Pl^ - 2r,l) =  W ^ --------- f r + h — + a S n ~ W T h -  m
An inspection of this equation indicates that the partial derivative of the 
price differential with respect to the exchange rate will be negative provided 
that
(3 — 2t}1 >  0. (53)
□
Gartner (1993) shows that this result can also be obtained by solving the 
above equation for s12 and taking the partial derivative with respect to money 
supply, while keeping prices constant at the moment of change in money 
levels. This derivative is greater than 1 (the change needed to bring the 
exchange rate to the new equilibrium level) under the same conditions on 
the economic parameters. In such circumstances, following an unexpected 
increase in a variable such as relative money supply, m i2, the equilibrium 
exchange rate will rise proportionately, as will the equilibrium level of the 
price differential. Then as the current price differential starts to rise, the 
current exchange rate starts to fall. Assuming the system was in equilibrium 
before the change in money supply, this implies that the current exchange 
rate must have increased at the same instant as the money supply change, 
but by a greater amount than the new equilibrium level. This is the so 
called overshooting effect of the original Dornbusch formulation of the model, 
and is a means of explaining why, in practice, the variability in exchange 
rates seems more than what would be implied if exchange rates moved to 
new equilibrium levels in some ‘smooth’ way. Of course, this condition on
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the economic parameters may not hold, in which case both prices and the 
exchange rate increase steadily following a disturbance, towards their new 
equilibrium levels. However, as Gartner points out, theoretical considerations 
make this latter possibility much less plausible. In order to consider the 
possibility of whether or not the exchange rate overshoots in more detail, it 
will be helpful to rewrite the inequality for overshooting, (53), as below
The general sequence of events following a change in money supply can be 
summarised as follows. Assume initially, the exchange rate is at equilibrium 
with no movement anticipated by the market. Therefore, according to the 
UIP condition the interest rates in the two countries must be the same. 
Suppose that there is a sudden, unexpected increase in money supply in 
country 1 , so the exchange rate immediately rises, that is country l ’s currency 
depreciates. This depreciation results in an increased demand for goods via 
higher exports, and hence increased supply, the amount depending upon the 
elasticity of net exports to the real exchange rate, 77 and the coefficient (3. 
An increase in money supply must also result in an equal increase in money 
demand, as these are assumed in equilibrium at all times. Hence the demand 
for real money balances in equation (30) also increases. Part of this increase 
will be met by the extra supply of goods resulting from the higher exports, 
the effect being governed by the value of the income elasticity of money 
demand, I. The remaining increase in demand for real money balances is 
met by a fall in interest rates within the country. However, the change in the 
exchange rate will also result in a reduction in net exports from the second 
country, equal to the increase from country 1. In order for the relationship 
for real money balances in country 2  to continue to hold, interest rates must 
fall there also in order to offset the reduction in supply resulting from the 
lower exports. If relationship (54) is an equality rather than an inequality, 
that is if
then it transpires that the reduction in interest rates required in the two 
countries is identical and so they remain equal in level also. As the UIP
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condition, equation (1 0 ), is assumed to hold, the identical interest rates would 
imply that the market does not anticipate any further change in the exchange 
rate. In other words, following the change in money supply the exchange rate 
moves directly to its new equilibrium level.
On the other hand, if inequality (54) holds, then the initial depreciation 
of the exchange rate results in a larger fall in the interest rate in the first 
country compared to the second country. According to the UIP condition, 
this must be reflected in the markets anticipation of an appreciation to the 
exchange rate. So the exchange rate must have overshot the new equilibrium 
level initially. Similarly, if inequality (54) is reversed, the initial depreciation 
results in so much extra exports and hence supply of goods in country 1 , 
that it more than offsets the increase needed in real money balances. In 
this case interest rates may actually have to increase in country 1  in order to 
maintain equality in real money balances. Consideration of the UIP condition 
therefore indicates in this case that following the initial jump, the exchange 
rate continues to depreciate towards its new equilibrium level.
Hence, if overshooting does not occur, this may be due to an usually high 
elasticity for net exports 77, resulting in more than the necessary increase in 
supply needed to keep real money balances in equilibrium. Alternatively, 
the same effect would be produced by an unusually large income elasticity 
of money demand Z, so even small increases in supply result in relatively big 
increases in the demand for real money balances. The final alternative of a 
very small value for the coefficient /3, would by the derivation of equation (14) 
imply that the fixed proportion of output which goes in domestic personal 
sector consumption of goods and services is very high. Any increase in the 
output in country 1 needed to meet a modest rise in exports would be ac­
companied by a large increase for domestic personal consumption; the latter 
resulting from the earnings from the extra exports. The two contributions 
together are once again more than is needed to maintain the relationship for 
real money balances, and so the exchange rate once again undershoots its 
new equilibrium level.
The possibility of the exchange rate overshooting is gin important property 
of the price inertia model but of equal interest is consideration of the actual 
path the exchange rate takes in reaching its equilibrium level. This we shall 
now turn to. In order to examine how prices and the exchange rate change 
explicitly with time, we first return to the expression for the rate of change 
in relative prices previously derived in Proposition 2,
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~  = p k ^  , (kgn  +  2kg (s12 -  Pn) +  7"»i2 -  IPn) ~  4m n-
This can be rearranged to give the following
J 1
~ W  =  W T i i  k^9w +  2kr> ^S l2  ~~ Pl2^+ 7 ,7112 ~  7 P l 2  -  ^k9n ~  7^ 12^ '
7  (56)
Eliminating money supply from equations (47) and (49) gives the following 
relationship between the equilibrium levels of the relative prices and exchange 
rate,
2 t/(si2 -  Pi2) =  ~9n  +  Py12- (57)
Then, after rearranging, the rate of change can be written as follows
J  1
~ d t  =  p k  4 - 7 / (2kV ^ 12 ~  *12  ^ 2kT] ^ 12 ”  Pl2  ^ +  7  ^ 12 ~~ Pl2 ~  ’
This can be simplified further to give
^  =  p i^ i  {2kr>{sn ~  3 l2 )" {2kn +  7) ^  "  P l2))' ^
In order to obtain an explicit solution to this differential equation, we shall 
reformulate it with an additional, simplifying assumption. It will be assumed 
that the short term supply of goods is fixed at the long term natural level in 
both countries. That is, yi(t) =-yit for all times t. In these circumstances, the 
short term supply and demand for goods will not be in equilibrium, unless of 
course the latter happens to equal the natural level of output in an economy.
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P roposition  4 If the short term supply of goods is fixed, the movement of 
the exchange rate is given by the following equation
sn{t) =  S12 +  (si2 (0 ) -  s i2)e Vl2t
where S12 is the equilibrium level of the exchange rate, and s i2 (0 ) the level 
at time t =  0 , immediately following a change in the fundamental variables. 
Proof
W ith the assumption of fixed supply in both countries, the planned de­
mand for goods and services in country 1 will be given by the equivalent 
expression to equation (12) in Section 1.4 , but in log-linear form and with 
national output equal to y 1, that is
2/? =  6iVi ~  7 i r i +  9 i +  r}(s n  +  p 2 -  Pi).  (59)
The corresponding equation for the demand for goods and services in country 
2 is obtained similarly. As noted previously, the rate of price inflation in the 
two countries is given by
$  =  -  a )-
Hence, after substituting for yf, and as before, assuming identical macroeco­
nomic parameters in the two countries, the rate of change in relative prices 
can be written as
(2 ?/ (s i2  -  pi2) +  (6 -  1 ) y 12 +  gn ~  7  (n  ~  **2 )) • (60)
As derived in equation (57), the relationship between equilibrium levels of 
relative prices and the exchange rate, can be shown to be
2 t7(si2 -  p 12) =  - g 12 +  (3y12 
where, using the same notation as in Section 1.4 , we have put {3 =  1 — 6.
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Hence, substituting in the rate of change equation and rearranging, we 
obtain
^  =  (j) (2rj (S12 -  S12) -  2?7 (pi2 -  p12)) • (61)
Taking the difference in the LM equations for the two countries gives in 
this case
m 12 -  p i2 =  ly12 -  k (n  -  r2), (62)
where the aggregate supply of goods is now constrained to equal the nat­
ural level in each country. Once again, assuming adaptive exchange rate 
anticipations, implies the above equation can be written as follows
m 12 -  pn  =  ly12 -  ka(s12 -  s12). (63)
As before, at equilibrium when the exchange rate stops evolving, we have 
that
P12 =  m i2 ~  W12. (64)
The difference in the LM relationships, equation (63), can therefore be writ­
ten as
P12 “  P12 = &a(si2 -  S12).
Substituting this in to equation (61) for the rate of change,
d p n  (P \2  ~~ P12) n„,„ =
-d T  =  { - — ^    Pm) )  ■
This can be simplified to give
gives
(65)
(66)
^  =  - 2 # ( 1 +  jl ) ( Pl2 - p 12) .
43
(67)
This linear first-order differential equation with constant coefficients has so­
lution
Pi2 (t) =  P12 +  (Pi2 (0 ) -  Pn)e~vut (6 8 )
where V12 =  2r](j) ( l +  , and Pn(Q) is the initial relative price level when
relative money supply is changed. Because V12 >  0, the relative price level 
converges to its long term equilibrium level. The change in prices is linked 
to the change in the exchange rate by the following, previously derived rela­
tionship in equation (65),
P n  ~  P n ( t )  =  ka(su {t) -  si2).
As this holds for all times, including at time t =  0, immediately following a 
change in the fundamental variables, we obtain
P12 ~  £ 1 2(0 ) =  fca(si2(0) -  S12). (69)
Therefore, substituting for price differences in terms of the exchange rate in 
equation (68) gives
$1 2 ( 0  =  ^12 +  (^12(0 ) — si2)e~Vlit (70)
where 8 1 2 (0 ) is the value of the exchange rate immediately following the 
change in money supply.
□
Hence, following a change in a variable such as money supply, the exchange 
rate also moves exponentially towards its equilibrium value.
It can be seen that the speed at which the exchange rate moves towards 
its equilibrium value depends upon V12 and hence upon the four parameters 
a, rj, (j> and k.
A number of variations axe possible in the formulation of the price inertia 
model. As noted above, short term output can either be assumed to be fixed
44
or in equilibrium with the short term demand for goods. On the other hand, 
the demand for goods itself is sometimes assumed, for reasons of simplic­
ity, not to be related to interest rates at all; or more realistically, related to 
interest rates adjusted for the anticipated rate of price inflation in the cor­
responding country. For example, the latter assumption is made by Frankal 
(1979) and in Miller and Weller (1990) and followed in the description of the 
stochastic version of the price inertia model in Section 4.2.
2 .2 .2  M ore than  tw o countries
Consider a small network consisting of three countries. Then, as in Section
2 .1 .2 , the cyclic no-arbitrage condition would require that at any point in 
time
s 12 4- S23 4- S31 — 0. (71)
Suppose that prices and the exchange rate adjust according to the equations 
obtained in Section 2.2.1 where short term supply was assumed constant in 
each country. Then, with the same notation as in Section 2.2.1, equation 
(70) would give the corresponding solution for each pair of countries. Cyclic 
no-arbitrage would then require
5 12 4 - (5 1 2 (0 ) — S i2 )e  Vl2t +  S23 +  (5 2 3 (0 ) — 523) e  v23t +  S31
+ (531(0) - s 31) e ~ v ^  =  0 y
where and U31 are defined as the corresponding combinations of macro 
economic parameters as ^12. Now, as in the previous Section, the new equi­
librium level for the exchange rate between countries 1 and 2  can be shown 
to be
- m  , (P - 2r>l)yn 9nSl2 _  m n  + -------------   — . (72)
Assuming that the macroeconomic parameters are the same in the three 
countries, and recalling that the no-arbitrage condition requires that S31 =  
—5 1 3 , it is readily verified that
512 +  523 4- 531 =  0.
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If in addition, the parameters relating to rates of adjustment, a  and (f) are 
also identical, then the difference between the initial and the equihbrium 
exchange rates for a pair of countries given in equation (69), can be written 
as follows
/ .  \ /no, (sij(O) Sij) — ^  ■ (^ )
It is then readily verified that the above cyclic no-arbitrage condition,
Sl2 +  s23 +  531 =  0,
is met.
It is also worth noting that unless the macroeconomic and rate of adjust­
ment parameters are assumed to be identical as we have just done, it would 
not be possible for the cyclic no-arbitrage condition to be met in practice, 
at least for all time t. For instance, no-arbitrage at all times would certainly 
require that V\<i =  V23 — ^3 1- Hence, even if the macroeconomic parame­
ters k , 77 and <f) are assumed identical in the three countries, which may be 
plausible, at least approximately, for countries of similar levels of economic 
development, the definition of the would still require that
Q!l2 =  C*23 =  <*31- (74)
That is, the rate of adjustment is the same for the exchange rate between 
each country. Thus, the rates of adjustment are not independent but are 
constrained by the cyclic no-arbitrage condition, which is invariably observed 
in practice.
2.3 Summary
In Section 2.1 the monetary model for two countries was formulated. The 
assumptions of PPP holding continuously and that prices are completely 
flexible, result in a relatively simple model for exchange rate movements. 
However, the dynamics of the system are not necessarily as straightforward 
as they may appear from an inspection of the model. In particular, the 
basic formulation says nothing about how interest rates behave. In reality
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these cannot be arbitrary. For instance, if UIP is assumed to hold then the 
interest differential must be equal to the market’s anticipated rate of change 
in the exchange rate. This in turn may be assumed to be formulated in 
many different ways; perfect foresight, adaptive expectations, etc. However, 
because of the PPP assumption, the model will always result in the cyclic 
no-arbitrage condition being met for networks of more than two countries, 
whatever mechanism we may postulate for interest rate movements.
The price inertia model for two countries of comparable size was derived 
in Section 2 .2 . W ith plausible assumptions for the economic parameters 
the model was shown to exhibit the so called overshooting effect for the 
exchange rate. This effect is important as it is a mechanism for explaining 
the observed phenomenon that the variability in exchange rate movements 
is much larger than might be expected from the known changes in economic 
variables such as money supply. As a means of explaining the observed large 
variation in exchange rate movements, the price inertia model has certainly 
had a considerable influence since its initial formulation by Dombusch. The 
fined result of this Section is of some interest although little mentioned in the 
literature. Because PPP does not hold continuously, if the cyclic no-arbitrage 
condition is assumed to hold for a network of countries (which it is invariably 
observed to do in practice) the macroeconomic and other parameters of the 
various countries cannot be independent. Although this result was derived for 
a rather simplified model in which corresponding macroeconomic parameters 
in each country are assumed identical and the supply of goods fixed in each 
country, a less restrictive model is more rather than less likely to exhibit 
similar constraints. It is a mute point whether this has more to say about 
the assumptions behind the model, or about unknown economic mechanisms 
which might constrain parameters in some way.
In the following Chapter, an extension to the standard analysis of the 
price inertia model is considered. Most analyses in the literature assume for 
simplicity that the macroeconomic parameters are identical in each country. 
In Chapter 3, the tractability and implications for the model of m aking asym­
metric assumptions about macroeconomic parameters for countries, together 
with a formulation in nominal money terms, is examined, and the limiting 
behaviour of the exchange rate discussed.
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3 A  price inertia m odel in nom inal, linear 
form
3.1 M otivation
In Section 2.2 the basic price inertia model for the exchange rate between 
two countries was derived in traditional form. However, the results derived 
in the literature from the model invariably rely on the assumption that the 
corresponding macroeconomic parameters are the same for both countries. 
Usually the justification for this approach is that it simplifies the analysis 
while preserving the essential nature of the results. In this Chapter the 
tractability of the analysis is explored when different macroeconomic param­
eters are allowed in each country. In addition, while the equations employed 
in the consideration of the goods and monetary sectors usually have many of 
the variables in real terms, that is after deflation by a relevant price index, 
the economic arguments can also be formulated in nominal money terms, 
that is in current prices. The current Chapter therefore explores the nature 
of the exchange rate dynamics with such a modification to the formulation. 
Further, although many of the basic relationships are usually, as in Section
2 .2 , derived in log-linear form, it will be shown that a linear formulation of 
the equations provides an useful framework for enabling an explicit relation­
ship between the exchange rate and time to be produced. For the model 
considered, it will be shown that following a disturbance, there are a range 
of possible limiting values for both the nominal and real exchange rates.
3.2 Derivation o f th e system  o f equations
In the usual derivation of the IS equation, the value of the relevant vari­
ables are given in real, that is in deflated or volume terms. However, as the 
fundamental identity between the demand and supply of goods, from which 
the IS equation is derived, is usually stated in nominal terms, it seems more 
logical to obtain the IS equation in these terms also. In addition, exogenous 
variables such as government spending, are more readily interpreted when 
measured in nominal money units, rather than as money volumes. As in the 
derivation of the IS equation in Section 2.2.1, savings are assumed to increase 
with rising income and interest rates, while investment falls with increasing 
interest rates. Therefore, if we also assume a linear relationship with these
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variables, we may write the IS equation for the first country in nominal terms 
as follows
P1W1 4- 7 jri =  Gi value of net trade, (75)
where G” is government spending in nominal terms, which is taken to be ex­
ogenous to the model, and W\ is national output in country 1 , also measured 
in nominal money terms.
Although the value of net trade on the current account may depend upon 
many variables, it is reasonable to assume that the first domain’s goods will 
become more competitive as the real exchange rate SviPi!P\, increases and 
thereby influence the level of trade between the two domains. As in Section 
2 .2 .1 , we shall assume therefore that the value of net trade is a function of 
the reeil exchange rate. Although this functional dependence may be quite 
general, for convenience we shall assume that relationship is linear, or more 
precisely that the relationship can be adequately represented by the first term 
of its Taylor expansion. As a first approximation we may therefore write the 
IS equation as follows
PiWt + 7 1t'2 =  G? +  ’?12p12f>2 (76)
where 7)12 is a constant. The IS equation for the second country will take a 
similar form but noting that the real exchange rate for the second country 
will be given by S2 1P1 /  P2 - Hence, we have
/ W 2 +  72^ =  0 ;  + 7,21 p l P l - (77)72
For the money sector, the demand for money can be taken to be positively 
related to the level of national output, in order to facilitate transactions in 
goods and services. However it can also be assumed to decline with the 
rising opportunity cost of holding money, as measured by interest rates. The 
modified LM equation for the first country can therefore be written as
  M1 =  l1W1 - k 1r 1 (h ,k i >  0), (78)
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where Mi is the national money supply in nominal terms, and is assumed to 
be equal to money demand at all times. Similarly, and with corresponding 
notation, we have for the second country
M2 =  l2W2 -  k2r2. (79)
For each country, equilibrium in the money and goods sectors occurs when 
the national output and interest rate are at levels which simultaneously fulfil 
the IS and LM equations. As in Section 2.2.1, it is implicit in this approach 
that the short term supply of goods is able to adjust to meet demand at 
all times. In addition, it will be assumed that as in Section 2.2.1, it is the 
movement of demand for goods away from the long term natural level of 
supply, which drives the change in prices within each country. W ith the 
foregoing derivations of the IS and LM equations, the values of national 
output and interest rates which simultaneously solve the IS and LM equations 
in country 1 are
m }
r ll ( r n I ^12^1 2 ^ 2  P \M i\ ( .
Ti =   r ) -  (81)
The corresponding solutions in country 2 being
^  =  j f a l ,  f a  +  f a f a  +  f a  (82) 
7-2 =  (83)
Unlike in Section 2.2.1 however, we shall not assume that the macroeconomic 
parameters sire identical in the two countries, as this will allow the formula­
tion to be as general as possible. As noted for equation (5 ) in Section 1.3, 
the no-arbitrage condition requires that S2\ — l/*Si2 So, the solutions for 
the second country can be written as follows
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Wi  -  ^ k 2 \ i , k + * 3 ? +Ms72)
_  h f  cm  V2lPl _  0 2 ^ \
02^2 +  72^ 2 \  2 S 1 2P2 h  )
We shall show that the above assumptions, coupled with that of perfect 
foresight, leads to a dynamical system which can be described by the following 
differential equations.
P roposition  5 The system of differential equations describing the evolution 
of the model with perfect foresight is as follows
i § l , c , s „  +  3 &  +  c, r „
dt Jr12
d jP 12 n , o , < * ^ 1 2~  c±Pl2 +  c5*^ 12 H------
>12
where Pi2 is the ratio of prices in the two countries, and the coefficients c*, 
are combinations of the macroeconomic parameters for the countries.
Proof.
As noted in Section 1.3, the assumption of perfect substitutability of 
assets with no restrictions on capital movements, implies that uncovered 
interest rate parity holds continuously. That is, the market’s anticipated 
rate of change in the exchange rate is approximately equal to the interest 
rate differential, as below
If, in addition, the market is assumed to have perfect foresight so that the 
anticipated rate of change in the exchange rate is equal to the actual rate of 
change, then the uncovered interest rate parity condition can be written as
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5!12
*12
=  ri -  r2. (86)
Upon substituting the previously derived values for r\ and r2 from equa­
tions (83) and (85), in to this relationship, we obtain
o' _  
° 1 2  ~
5 i2/ i
P i k i + h h
@2^ 2 +  72^ 2
GJ ftA fl ^12^12-^2
/l A
> n  P2 M 2 ,
2 / 2 ^12^ ;
(87)
In Section 2.2.1, it was noted that in the price inertia model the rate of change 
of prices is assumed to be a function of the excess demand for goods in each 
country. We shall therefore assume that within each country there exists a 
level, in nominal terms, such that when output is at this level there is no 
price inflation. We shall represent this level by W*. In the simplest situation, 
the function will be taken to be a linear relationship, with a coefficient of 
proportionality fa for the ith country. That is
= 4> i ( W f  -  W t ) , (88)
where W f represents the demand for goods and services in money terms. 
The assumption that short term supply is equal to the demand for goods 
implies that W* =  W f. Therefore, substituting from equations (80) and (82), 
the rate of price adjustment in the two countries is
*iPi
Piki +
ki V1 2S1 2P2
Pi
+  Ml7 l -  faPxW i (89)
and
p f  =  <t> 2p 2
2 /?2^ 2  +  7 2^2
&2G? + 2^^2 1 ^ 1
S1 2P2 +  ^272 ) — 4>2p2^r2'
(90)
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The system can be rewritten by consideration of the two endogenous variables 
5 *12, and the ratio of relative prices P12 =  P i/P 2- After some manipulation, 
the rates of change of the two exogenous variables can be obtained as follows
and
dS12 0 , c2 S? 2 , „
-J,  ' =  C i5 i 2 H   CzP\2 (91)at Jri2
=  c4 P 12 +  c6512 +  (92)
a t  D i 2
where
ci =  — p ( G i - Z p ) -  *  , ^ '+ 7i^i \  h )  02^2 +  72/2 \  h
hm*C2 =
c3 =
/^i^i +  7i^i 
~ h rl2i
02^2 +  72/2
C 4 = ( m T m  (fclG” + M l7 l)  -  M' 1)  “  ( j 2k r + W ,h (fc2G?+M2T2)"  ^ 2
0 lM l 2C5 =
Cg
/^i^i +  7 ^ 1
—(f>2k 2?72i 
# ^ 2 +  72*2*
□
The above pair of equations can be solved in order to determine how the 
nominal exchange rate varies with time. However, before doing so it will be 
helpful to examine the evolution of the real exchange rate over time.
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3.3 Evolution of th e real exchange rate
Suppose, as in Section 1.2, we denote the real exchange rate by Q. That is
Q =  (93)
1
Then we shall show the following result.
P roposition  6  The real exchange rate fulfils the following relationship
Q  ^    7^  ta(a—6)
Q — 6 ~
where a  and 6 are the roots of a quadratic equation involving the macroeco­
nomic parameters, and C  is a constant of integration.
Proof.
On taking logarithms of the equation defining Q and differentiating with 
respect to time, we obtain
Q ~  S 12 P , +  P, i j
In the previous Section it was assumed that UIP holds continuously and the 
market has perfect foresight. This led to the following relationship
12—-  =  n  -  r2.
*->12
It was further assumed that the rate of price inflation in the ith country is 
determined by the following equation
§  = H W *  -  W ().
■*»
Hence, after inserting these relationships into equation (94) for the real ex­
change rate and substituting the previously derived values for and W f  
which simultaneously solve the IS and LM equations, we obtain
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aQ +  b +  | (95)
where
“ - J P T F W ' 1
, =  k  (fin _  A  Ml _  ^fciG? 01 Mi-yA  
ftfci +  T i ^ V 1 k  k  )
 k f  ,m __ @2^2 _  02^2^2 0 2A^272 \
&*» +  72*2 \  2 *2 *2 k  )  '
Hence, on multiplying through by Q and separating the variables we obtain
=  dt. (96)
aQ2 “I- bQ +  c
That is
 -------=  dt- (97)
a(Q2 +  b-§ +  f )  1 ^
If we assume the quadratic in Q has roots a  and 6, which may be reed or 
complex, then on using partial fractions we obtain the relation
dQ dQ = d t .  (98)a(a — 6)(Q — a) a(a — 6)(Q — 6)
The result of integrating this relation will depend upon the signs of Q — a  
and Q — 6. Therefore, for the present, assume that the roots a  and S are reeil
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and that both Q — a  and Q — 6 are positive. Then integrating both sides 
yields
/  0  — a \  a(a~6)
( » )
where C  is a constant of integration. Taking antilogs gives a solution of the 
form
9_Z?_ =  Ceta(a- 6). (100)
0
C  can be taken as constant provided a, b and c remain unchanged.
□
The roots a  and 6 will of course be real provided b2 — Aac >  0, and 
complex otherwise. When the roots are real and a is negative, the solution
given in equation (1 0 0 ) can be shown to be equivalent to the following
^  -  =  coth( 0  — ta£), (1 0 1 )
where
t  y/b2 — 4ac 
2 a ‘
If a is positive, the coth function is replaced by tanh.
For real roots but differing assumptions about the sign of Q — a  or Q — 6 
the solutions can be obtained similarly while ensuring that the arguments of 
the appropriate log function are positive.
When the roots are complex and a is positive, the solution given in equa­
tion (1 0 0 ) can be shown to be equivalent to
0 +  —  ~
 — =  tan ( 0  +  tas), (1 0 2 )
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where
y/Aac — ft2 
 ^ 2a
If a is negative then tan is replaced by cot.
3.4 Implications for th e real exchange rate
If we examine the solution for the evolution of the real exchange rate with 
time, some deductions can readily be made concerning its limiting behaviour. 
For example, the solution for reed roots, and initial value of Q following a 
disturbance such that Q — a  and Q — S being both positive, was earlier found 
to be
Q ~~ a  — r ,pta(a~s)
Q - 6
It can be observed that if a is negative, then since a — 6 is positive, as 
t —* oo the right hand side of this equation approaches zero. This implies 
that Q —► a  in order that should also approach zero. This then is the 
long term limiting value for the reed exchange rate under these assumptions. 
In general, for values of b which ensure at least one positive real root, the 
limiting value of Q will depend upon the signs of the coefficients a and c. 
The limits of Q for the possible combinations of a and c are listed below
1. If a <  0, c >  0, then for any initial value of Q >  0, Q —► a  as t —»■ oo.
2. If a ^ 0 , c ^ 0 , then for an initial value of ^  ^ (5, ^   ^ q as t  ^ oo. 
However, if initially, 0 <  Q <  <5, then Q —► 0 in finite time.
3. If a >  0, c >  0, then for an initial values, 0 < Q < a ,  Q —► <5 as £ —► oo.
If the initial value is Q >  a , then Q —* oo, in finite time.
4. If a >  0, c <  0, then for initial values, 0 < Q < a ,  Q —»-0 in finite time.
If the initial value is Q > a , then Q —*■ oo, in finite time.
Except in the unlikely event that the combined magnitudes of the various 
exogenous variables and macroeconomic parameters are such that either a
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or <5 is equal to 1 , purchasing power parity in absolute terms ( Q =  1 ) will 
not hold, even in the long term, whatever the initial conditions might be.
Having examined the possible limits for the real exchange rate we may 
inquire as to the limiting behaviour of the nominal exchange rate itself. In 
order to do so, we shall first obtain the relationship between the nominal 
exchange rate and the ratio of relative prices. This we can do by returning 
to the system of equations in Section 3.2.
3.5 The nominal exchange rate
In Section 3.2 the system of equations for the rate of change of the nominal 
exchange rate and the relative prices was shown in equations (91) and (92) 
to be as follows
^  =  c\S  +  +  czP (103)
H P  ✓». p2
_  _  C4 p +C5 s + 5 l _  (:04)
where, for convenience, we have dropped the subscripts on S  and P . This 
system of equations is not of course defined along the lines P  — 0 and 5  =  0. 
However, as the system of equations is homogenous in S  and P , an explicit 
solution to the system can be found. We first show that the system can be 
reduced to a single differential equation
P roposition  7 The system of equations can be reduced to the following
dP  _  KidQ K 2 (2 ( c 2 -  c5) Q +  (ci_c4)) dQ 
P  Q ((c2 -  c5) Q2 +  (ci - c 4) Q  +  (c3 -  ce))
j . K 3dQ
Q2 + (£iz£4lg  + l£3z£6l ’
^  ( c 2 c 5 )  ( C 2 - C 5 )
where Q is the real exchange rate, and the coefficients K j are functions of 
the c*.
Proof
Providing that 5 ^ 0  and P ^ O ,  combining the two equations (103) and 
(104) gives the following
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dS =  S(Clg P  +  c25 2 +  c3 P 2)
dP P (c iS P  +  c5 5 2 +  cgP2) ' ( 1
From the definition of the reed exchange rate Q, we can write S  =  QP. 
Hence, upon substituting for S  in the above equation and simplifying, we 
obtain
(106)
dS _  Q(ciQ  +  c2 Q 2 +  c3) 
dP C4Q  +  c5 Q2 +  c6
As dS /dP  can be written as
dS dQ _  =  o  A-— P  
dP  V dP  ’
from equation (106), we obtain the following relationship
On separating the variables and using partial fractions, we obtain
dP  _  KidQ K 2 ( 2  (c2 -  c5) Q +  (ci_c4)) dQ
P  Q ((c2 -  c5) Q 2 +  (cj -  c4) Q +  (c3 -  Ce))
+ --------, , r, (108)ry i 1 (c i-c4) ^) ■ (c3-ce) v 1
W  ^  ( C 2 - C 5 ) ^ +  ( C 2 - C B )
provided the relevant terms in the denominators do not vanish, and where
U i =  06
c3 ~  ce
jy  (c3 C5 C2Ce)
A 2 —
2  (c3 -  ce) (c2 -  c5) ’
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K  _  2 (c3c4 -  cicg) (c2 -  c5) -  (c3c5 ~  c2c6)
3 2 (c2 — c5)2 (c3 -  c6)
□
As with the evolution of the real exchange rate, the solution of the above 
equation will depend upon the signs of the various component terms. For 
example, let the quadratic in Q in the last term of the equation have roots cu 
and r. Rirther, let us assume that these roots are recti and that Q — lj and 
Q — t  are positive. Then provided the quadratic in Q in the second term of 
the integrand is also positive, integrating both sides gives the following
C  4- log P  =  K x log Q +  K 2 log ((c2 -  c5) Q2 4- (c2 -  c4) Q 4- (c3 -  eg))
' K ° (109)(lj — r) \ Q  — r
where C  is a constant of integration. On writing C  =  log C  and substituting 
S /P  for Q in equation (109), we obtain the result
d P  =  ( ? )  *  ( (C2 ~ cs) ( ? ) 2 +  (ci “ Ci) ( ? )  +  (C3"  ( f ^ T
Ut—'i
The roots l j  and r  are of course given by the following
^   (^ 1 C4) / (^ 1 C4) (c3 Cq)
2 (c2 -  c5) V 4 (c2 -  c5) (c2 -  c5)
r = (ci -  c4) /  (ci -  c4)2 (c3 -  Cg)
2  (c2 -  c5) V 4 (c2 -  c5) (c2 -  c5)
After some manipulation, it can be seen that the roots tu and r  are iden­
tical with the roots of the quadratic in the solution of the real exchange rate 
equation, that is, u  =  a  and r  — 6.
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In Section 3.3, the limiting behaviour of the real exchange rate when the 
coefficients where such that, a <  0 , c > 0, and the initial value of Q was 
greater than a, with real roots, was shown to be that Q —► a  as t —► oo. 
Therefore, using this limiting value of Q in the above equation indicates that 
in these circumstances P  —► 0 as t  —> oo. As the limiting value of S /P  is 
finite, the limiting value of S must also be 0. The limiting values of S  and P  
for other initial values of Q and different assumptions about the coefficients, 
can in principle be obtained similarly.
3.6 Summary
The foregoing results indicate that the analysis of the model is certainly 
tractable even with asymmetric assumptions concerning the macroeconomic 
parameters between countries. However, the simplifying assumption of iden­
tical macroeconomic parameters would not, in general, affect the qualitative 
nature of solutions, since the parameters are absorbed into the coefficients 
of the equations describing the system, for example equations (91) and (92). 
This non-reliance upon symmetry includes the semi-elasticities for interest 
rates at least for the perfect foresight formulation of market anticipations 
used in this formulation.
In general, the solutions to the model are typified by a large range of 
possible limiting behaviour, both for the real exchange rate and for its com­
ponent parts; the nominal exchange rate and relative prices. After some 
disturbance, such as a change in one country’s money supply, the system is 
typified by a continuous adjustment of both S  and P.  In practise, this lim­
iting behaviour is almost certain to be interrupted by further disturbances 
and consequential adjustment of the rates. As the type of limiting behaviour 
may be quite different after each disturbance, the movements in both the 
nominal and the real exchange rates may be much more volatile than what 
might have been anticipated from a relatively minor change in one exogenous 
variable. This alternative framework of working with nominal variables and 
linear equations appears both tractable and fruitful in terms of describing 
the dynamics of the exchange rate. However, one possible criticism is that 
in order for the analysis to be tractable, the price adjustment mechanism, 
equation (8 8 ), needed to be formulated using the difference in current sup­
ply and its long term level, both measured in nominal terms. It might be 
more reasonable to argue that the rate of change in prices should still, as 
in Section 2 .2 , be related to differences measured in volume, that is deflated
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terms. Possibly, further consideration of the dimensionality of the variables 
involved would enable one or more of the basic equations to be reformulated 
so that a system incorporating a more realistic price adjustment mechanism 
would then be tractable.
In both Chapters 2 and 3 the relationships between the variables, as­
sumed as part of the models, were purely deterministic. However, it might 
be considered unlikely that these relationships, such as the one postulated 
for money demand, will contain all the relevant factors affecting the dynam­
ics of the system. Therefore, in the next Chapter, in order to allow for this 
uncertainty random variables are incorporated in to some of the basic model 
relationships, giving rise to stochastic models. In subsequent Chapters it is 
demonstrated how these models can be used to describe the movements of 
exchange rates when limits are placed on their range of movements by central 
banks.
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4 Extension to  stochastic versions
4.1 The m onetary m odel
4.1.1 D erivation o f th e  differential equation
In previous Chapters, the models of the exchange rate were completely de­
terministic. However, since the relatively simple basic relationships postu­
lated for variables such as money demand, are unlikely to capture all the 
relevant factors which might conceivably affect the exchange rate, a more 
realistic proposal is that some or all of the relationships contain a random 
or stochastic element, in order to take into account the effect of factors not 
incorporated in to the model explicitly. Alternatively, such elements might 
be considered to represent the assumption that the ‘true’ relationship is in 
any event stochastic in the first place and writing the relationships in deter­
ministic form is merely a convenient simplification. Then, by making further 
assumptions concerning the properties of these random elements the dynam­
ics of the exchange rate can be investigated. As a first step, we shall assume 
that the exchange rate between two countries of similar size is determined by 
the flexible price monetary model. This is relatively simple compared with 
other models, but is interesting because a closed form solution exists for this 
variation. The approach, at least in its current form, was first described in 
Krugman (1988) and more widely in Krugman (1991) and Krugman (1992). 
However, Williamson and Miller (1987), had previously discussed a simi­
lar but more elaborate model and Smith (1987) had discussed some related 
problems in stochastic process switching.
In the derivation of the deterministic monetary model the LM relationship 
in log-linear form for country i (i — 1 , 2 ) was shown in equation (2 1 ) of 
Section 2.1.1, to be as follows
mi -  pi =  kyi -  h
As before, ra* is the money supply for country i, pi is the price level, yi is 
real output, and r* is the interest rate. All variables except interest rates, 
are measured in logs. In the short term, if money supply, real output and 
interest rates are unchanged then domestic prices are constant. However, it 
is an assumption of the flexible price monetary model that if other variables 
do change, then prices can adjust instantaneously in order that the above 
relationship continues to hold.
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It will now be assumed that the demand for real money balances depends 
not only on real output and interest rates but possibly also on other factors. 
The cumulative effect of these other factors will be represented by a stochastic 
variable. The LM equation for country i may now therefore be written as 
follows
m i— pi = kyi -  k-.in - 6i, (110)
where e* is (the log of ) the assumed stochastic demand variable, whose 
properties we shall return to shortly. As before, prices are assumed suitably 
flexible so that the above equation holds at all times. As noted in Section 
2 .1 .1 , a further assumption of the flexible price monetary model is that pur­
chasing power parity (PPP) holds in its absolute form, that is
S12 = P i  ~  P 2 ,
where s12 is the log of the exchange rate between the two countries. Substitut­
ing for pi and p% from the respective money demand relationships summarised 
in equation (1 1 0 ) gives
512 =  mi -  7712 +  hU2 -  llVl +  fa7*1 -  fc27*2 “  +  e2. ( i l l )
Further, if it is assumed that UEP holds with no restrictions on the flow of 
capital, then the market’s anticipated rate of change in the exchange rate 
equals the difference in interest rates. However, if rational expectations are 
assumed to hold for the market, then the market’s anticipated value of the 
future exchange rate is, on average, equal to the actual exchange rate at that 
point in time. Hence, by equation (41), viewing future values of the (log 
of) the exchange rate as a random variable, the market’s anticipated rate of 
change in the exchange rate, given all the information available at time t, 
can be written as
E(dsi2)t
dt ’
where E is the mathematical expectations operator. The assumption of UIP 
therefore results in the relationship
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E (dsi2)t
dt
ri -  r2. (112)
If it is further assumed that the interest semi-elasticity for the demand for 
money, k , is identical in the two countries, then substituting for the interest 
rate differential in equation (1 1 1 ) gives
Sj2 — rrii — m<i 4- Z2y2 — l\y\ — e\ +  e2 4- k — . (H3)
Suppose we define the fundamental measure for a country, /*, as
f i =  mi -  v{ (114)
where Vi =  e* — Uyi. If yi is assumed constant, at least in the short term, 
then the dynamics of Vi and e* will be identical.
The fundamental measure summarises the level of the underlying vari­
ables upon which the strength of a country’s currency depends. If we let 
fij =  fi — f j  be an index of the difference in fundamental determinants for 
the two currencies then equation (113) can be written as follows
_  ^ i ; E(ds12)t / i ic \
5 12 — fl2 +  k — —— . (115)
Before obtaining the solution for the exchange rate, it is worth observing that 
although this model was derived on the assumption that money demand de­
pended upon a stochastic variable, it could also be formulated with a random 
element to toteil money supply or in the PPP relationship. As indicated by
Delgado and Dumas (1990, 1992), in this case, i/* would represent a compos­
ite random variable, being the sum of the random elements in money supply, 
demand and the PPP relation.
4.1.2 T he stochastic dem and process
The dynamics of the exchange rate will depend of course on the nature of 
the process governing the variables One of the simplest assumptions
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(from the point of view of being able to obtain an explicit solution for the 
exchange rate) is that the stochastic demand variables e*, and hence i/*, follow 
a Brownian motion. This being the continuous time equivalent of a random 
walk. With this assumption, the change in Vi can be written as follows
dvi =  ^ d t  +  (Tidzi, (116)
where fi{ and <Ji axe constant and > 0 , and dzi is the increment of a standard 
Wiener process. In the original description of the model by Krugman the 
so called drift parameter (jl{ was assumed to be zero, but later authors, for 
instance Svenson (1991), and Delgado and Dumas (1992) show that the non­
zero situation can be readily incorporated in to the model.
A standard Wiener process, z(t), has the property that the change in 
z(t) over a short time period, dz, is a random variable drawn from a normal 
distribution. In addition, the mean of the change over the short time period 
is zero, and the variance of the change is equal to the period dt. One way of 
writing this is as follows
dz =  (f>Vdt, (117)
where <f> is a standard normal deviate. The choice of y/dt as the scaling factor 
is important since other values would result in either trivial or explosive
results as dt — ► 0. The term adz  therefore represents a Wiener process
whose variance is a 2dt. It is worth noting that the sample paths of a Wiener 
process are continuous but nowhere differentiable functions of time.
In the above equation for dv^ fii represents a deterministic trend in i/j, 
and a2 is referred to as the variance per unit time period for the process. 
Suppose we let iq2 =  iq — Now the first term in the expressions for the 
incremental change in V\ and i/ 2 are purely deterministic, and therefore the 
first term in the expression for the incremented change in iq2 will represent 
the deterministic trend /q — fi2' However, the second term in the incremental 
change to zq is proportional to an increment of a standard Wiener process 
and therefore, as noted above, may be written, at least symbolically, as
dzi =  (fiiVdt,
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where ^  is a standard normal deviate.
As the difference in two normal variables is also a normal variable, the 
second term in the expression for the incremental change in ^12 also behaves 
as a Wiener process with variance per unit time period of <j \ +  a\,  and can 
be written as
(°i + crl)*<t>12V d t ,
where 0 12 is also a standard normal variable. From equation (116), the 
incremental change in v i2 may therefore be written as
diV 12 =  Ml2dt +  CTl2 1^2, (118)
where fin =  fi1 — /i2, & 12 =  ° \  +  ° \  and ^ ^ 12  is the increment of a standard 
Wiener process.
The fundamental index, upon which the exchange rate depends, is a func­
tion not only of the stochastic variable V\ 2  but also of relative money supply 
between the two countries. By adjusting relative money supply countries 
can therefore attempt to influence the exchange rate. However, in order to 
obtain an explicit solution for the dynamics of the exchange rate we shall 
firstly consider the situation of when there is no change in money supply by 
either country, that is without intervention. As we shall see later, the dy­
namics of the system with a target zone imposed on the exchange rate can be 
obtained as a special case of the non-intervention solution with appropriate 
boundary conditions. The approach relies on results stemming from Harrison 
(1985) in which he showed how to derive solutions for a variety of problems 
in controlled Brownian motion. Harrison had previously described some of 
these ideas, in Harrison and Taksar (1983), and Harrison, Sellke and Taylor 
(1983).
4.1.3 D ynam ics o f  th e  exchange rate w ithout intervention
If countries do not attempt to influence the exchange rate by altering rela­
tive money supply, then the latter can be considered constant. Under these 
conditions the incremental change for the fundamental index defined in rela­
tionship (114), will be given as follows
67
df 12 — dl/ 12 =  fl^dt +  O l2dZi2- (119)
As dz \ 2 is a random variable rather than deterministic, the above is a form of 
stochastic differential equation, and the fundamental index will be a stochas­
tic variable. If the fundamental index had been deterministic, Taylor’s the­
orem could have been used to obtain a relationship between a small change 
in the exchange rate resulting from a small change in the fundamental in­
dex. However, as the latter is a stochastic variable to achieve the equivalent 
relationship we need to appeal to Ito’s lemma. W ith the assumption that 
S12 is a twice differentiable function of / 12, and using the relationship for 
d/ 1 2  obtained in equation (119), application of Ito’s lemma indicates that the 
incremental change to S12 can be written as follows
dsi2 ■ (  ds12 o 212d2s12\  , *
d s i 2 = w / n d Z i 2 + + )  ( }
Taking expectations conditional on the information set at time t, and noting 
that the expectation of the standard Wiener process dzn  is zero, gives
E(ds12)t _  .. dsn  , a \2(Psn
dt ~ M l2 dfn  +  2 d f l  ■ (1Z1)
Hence, substituting for the conditional expectation in the relationship be­
tween the exchange rate and the fundamental index, represented by equation 
(115), gives the following
,  , , dsn  k c \2d2Sn
Su - f i 2 +  kn12— +  . (1 2 2 )
This of course is an ordinary differential equation in the variable / 1 2  and has 
general solution
S 1 2  —  / 1 2  +  ^ 7 ^ 1 2  " h  A i e P l f l 2  +  A 2 e p 2 f l 2 ,  ( 123)
where p1 >  0  and p2 <  0 , are the roots of the equation
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Y ~ + ti12kp - 1 =  o,
and A\ and Aq are constants of integration.
If we impose the further assumption that the exchange rate should not 
grow explosively as / 1 2  —»■ ± 0 0  (which is possible since there is no restriction 
on the index in the non-intervention case), then this implies both constants 
of integration must be zero. The relationship between the exchange rate and 
the fundamental index, given in equation (123), would then reduce to
S12 =  / 1 2  +  k/j,12. (124)
This is usually referred to as the free float solution for the exchange rate. In 
the simplest situation of no deterministic trend, the (log of) the exchange 
rate is just equal to the fundamental index.
4.2 The price inertia m odel
4.2.1 D erivation o f th e  fundam ental differential equation
In the previous Section, it was assumed that the LM equation for each country 
contained a stochastic variable in order to represent the cumulative effect of 
those factors excluding real output and interest rates which might affect the 
demand for real money balances. However, in the price inertia model it is 
customary to assume that the stochastic variable representing uncertainty, 
forms part of the price adjustment equation. For convenience, we shall adopt 
the same approach but it is worth noting that the derivation is substantively 
unaltered if the stochastic variable appears in, say, the LM equation or even 
the IS equation, either in place of, or in addition to, a stochastic term in 
the price equation. In the latter case the variable we finally work with can 
be considered to be a composite of the individual stochastic variables. The 
approach adopted below, is based upon that given in Miller and Weller (1990) 
and Miller and Weller (1991). Following the same notation used in equation 
(20) of Section 1.5 the LM relationship for country i may be written as
m i - p i  =  ly{ -  kri.
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Miller and Weller assume an IS equation for country 1 of the following form
2/1 =  - 7 ( n  -  TTi) 4- rj(s12 -  Pi 4- p2). (125)
This is essentially of the same form as that discussed in Section 2.2.1 but 
with the following modifications. Firstly, the consumption of goods, and the 
level of investment, are assumed to depend on real interest rates, that is, 
domestic interest rates adjusted for the anticipated rate of domestic price 
inflation, 7Ti.This is usually accepted as being more realistic than assuming 
dependency on interest rates alone. Secondly, if net government expenditure 
is assumed constant over the time scale covered by the model, the dynamics 
of the system will not be affected qualitatively by its precise value. For 
convenience therefore, it has been taken as zero. Lastly, to simplify the 
presentation but without effecting the dynamics of the model, the coefficient 
of national real income has been taken as unity. This is equivalent to dividing 
through by the original coefficient which is arbitrary except for being positive.
Similarly, using the same assumptions and notation, the IS equation for 
the second country will be as follows
2/2 =  - 7 ( r2 -  7T2) -  f](s12 -  Pi 4-p2). (126)
As before, for convenience the macroeconomic parameters in the two coun­
tries have been assumed to be identical.
In Section 2.2.1 it was assumed that the rate of price adjustment in the 
price inertia model was proportional to the excess of the short term demand 
for goods and services over the long term equilibrium level of supply, y. In 
this Section we shall make the same assumption but, in addition, we shall 
assume that the change in price also depends upon the change in a stochastic 
variable e. Upon making the same assumption of equality between short 
term demand and national output as was done in Section 2.2.1, the price 
adjustment equation for country i can therefore be written as
dpi =  4KVi ~  Vi)dt 4- dei. (127)
If rational expectations are assumed to hold, then the market’s anticipated 
inflation rate can be equated with the expected value of the actual price
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change. Hence, using the same notation for the expected value of a random 
variable made at time t, with all information up to that point assumed known, 
we can write
( m )
Finally, we shall assume that the UIP condition holds continuously. As noted 
in Section 2.2.1, if rational expectations apply in the market, this is equivalent 
to requiring that the expected rate of change of the exchange rate is equal 
to the interest rate differential. That is
^ = n - r 2. (129)
Taking the difference in the price adjustment relationship for the two coun­
tries, given by equation (127), gives
dpi -  dp2 =  -  2/2 -  Vi +  y2)dt +  dei -  de2. (130)
Upon using the respective LM and IS equations to eliminate y\ and y2, in 
equation (130), we obtain
(2(f)kr)s12 -  p n i ^ -\-2kr](t))-h ( j r f m 12 -  +  k)y12)dt
aP\2 —---------------------------   —: — - H ae-i — ae2£7 +  k — (jyyk
(131)
where, pi2 =  Pi — P2 -, m i2 =  m  1 — m 2 and y12 =  Vi ~  y2- Similarly, after 
substituting for the equilibrium interest rates from the respective LM and IS 
equations, in to the UIP condition given by equation (129), we obtain
E/ds s {2lysn + Pn ( l  -  70 -  2Ivj) -  <faly12 -  (1 -  7 4>)mn )dt 
t Z7  +  k — (jyyk
If we assume that each of the stochastic variables in the price adjustment 
equations follow a Brownian motion, with no deterministic trend, then as 
discussed in Section 4.1.1 their rate of change can be written as
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dei =  (Tidzi (133)
where erf is the variance per unit time period for the variable and dzi is the 
increment to a standard Wiener process. Again, as noted in Section 4.1.1, 
the difference in the rates of change is also a Brownian motion with variance 
per unit time period erj2 =  o\ +  o\ and with an increment to a standard 
Wiener process of dz\2 . Then the following result can be obtained.
P roposition  8  Suppose s12 —m i2 =  f ip n  — m u) where f  is a deterministic, 
twice differentiable function, then
” ^ 2  (flll(p i2 — ^ 12) 4- a 12/ )  f  — (^21(Pl2 — ^-12) +  <*22/ )  =  0
where the coefficients a^ - are the i j  th elements of a matrix A.
Proof
Firstly, with the foregoing notation, equation (131) for the rate of change 
in relative prices can be written as
(2 # 7 7 S i2 - p i2(7 0  +  2fc7/0) + 0777112 - 0 ( J 7  +  fc)yi2)d i , ,
d P i 2 —---------------------- —7-7----— ------------------------ K o  n d z \ 2I'y +  k — (fr/k
(134)
The system of equations representing the dynamics of the process can then 
be represented in more succinct form by the following matrix relationship
dpn
E(dsi2)t =  A
(P12 -  m 12)dt 
(S12 -  m 12)dt +  B
0
y 12dt +
Ol2dZi2
0
(135)
where
A- i —0 ( 7  4 - 2kr}) 2(f)kr) 1  — 7 0  — 2lr] 2lr\
0  -<j)(l7  +  k) 
0  —(fry I
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and A =  p  4 - k — (fryk.
In order to simplify notation, redefine the variables p12 — m \i and Si2 — 
m 12 as deviations from the long term equilibrium values of the deterministic 
model. The system of equations may then be written as
dpu 
E(dsi2)t
Suppose Si2 —mi2 is a deterministic, twice differentiable function of (p12—m i2) 
which we shall denote by / .  Then, by Ito’s lemma, the incremental change 
to Si2 can be written as follows
ds\2 =  fdp i2  +  ^ dt (137)
from which it follows that
E(dsi2)t =  f W P i2 ) t  +  i ~ p )  dt. (138)
Now from the system of equations (136), we obtain E(dsi2)t =  a2iPi2dt +  
CL2 2 Si2dt and E(dpi2)t =  anp^dt-hai2Si2d£, where a# denotes the appropriate 
element of the matrix A. Hence, substituting for E(dsi2)* and E(dpi2)t in 
relationship (138), obtained by Ito’s lemma, we obtain
er2 f"
+  (an(pi2 ~  rn12) +  a12f )  f  — (a2i (p12 -  mi2) +  o22/ )  =  0 (139)
which is the required result. We shall refer to this as the fundamental differ­
ential equation.
□
The above second-order, nonlinear differential equation has no closed form 
solutions in general, but it is possible to characterize the qualitative features 
of the solutions under certain boundary conditions.
— A (jpi2 ~  m 12)dt 1 0  ndzi2 ux (s i2  -  m i2)dt 0 (136)
In order to characterize the solution paths, we shall make use of the eigen­
vectors of matrix A, which are denoted by SS and UU in figure 4.1. In fact, 
these are themselves solutions of the fundamental differential equation cor­
responding to the situation <7 =  0  and therefore represent the solution paths 
for the equivalent deterministic system. The slopes of these eigenvectors are 
obtained as the roots of a quadratic equation in the elements of A. As this 
equation plays a role in describing the solutions to the stochastic model it is 
worth obtaining it explicitly at this point.
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Figure 4.1 The eigenvectors of the system.
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Let an eigenvector of A, normalized on its first element, be written as 
follows
' 1 '
6 '
It must, by definition, satisfy the condition that
' 1 ' T
0
=  A
0
or, in detail,
flu 4- fli2$ =  A (1 0^ )
A21 4" o>22@ =  A$ (141)
where A is a root of the characteristic equation of A. Eliminating A from 
equations (140) and (141), gives the following requirement
p{9) =  fl2i 4- (fl22 — fln)0 — fli2 ^ 2 =  0. (142)
So p(6) represents the required quadratic expression whose zeros, Os and Ojj, 
give the slopes of the eigenvectors of A.
Next, consider all solutions to the differential equation satisfying the
boundary condition /(0 ) =  0. Since a second-order differential equation
requires two boundary conditions to tie down a unique solution, there will 
be an infinite family of trajectories passing through the origin. As noted in 
Section 2.2.1, deterministic price inertia models have qualitatively different 
exchange rate paths for their solutions depending upon whether the combina­
tion of economic parameters leads to an overshooting effect of the exchange 
rate or not. Although figure 4.1 illustrates the eigenvector positions cor­
responding to the usual overshooting case in which money supply remains 
unchanged after some initial disturbance, the following approach for qual­
itatively describing the solutions can readily be used with combinations of 
macroeconomic parameters which lead to eigenvectors with differing patterns 
of slopes.
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An inspection of the fundamental differential equation indicates that if 
f(pi2-m12) is a solution satisfying/(0) =  0, th en /(p i2-r a 12) =  -f(~(pi2~ 
777.12)). Therefore, all solutions are antisymmetric so we need only consider 
in detail the two quadrants in which pu  — m \ 2  > 0. In addition, it is 
worth noting that because of the requirement that /(0 ) =  0 the fundamental 
differential equation implies that /"(0) =  0 also. In order to analyse the 
trajectories, we shall firstly examine the properties of the solutions close to 
the equilibrium point, and then look at the more global properties of the 
solutions. The approach is that outlined in Miller and Weller (1989).
4 .2 .2  C urvature around equilibrium
The curvature of paths in the neighbourhood of the origin, here the equi­
librium point, can be determined by approximating the value taken by the 
second differential of any solution in that vicinity. Suppose, for ease of no­
tation, we let x =  P12 — — s i2 — 777,12 and we drop the subscripts
on <72. Then if f (x)  is a solution with the condition /(0 ) =  0, to a first 
approximation we have the following result.
P roposition  9 In the vicinity of the origin
y /" { l )  ~p(6)x
where p(6) is the quadratic equation whose zeros give the slope of the eigen­
vectors of matrix A.
Proof
Suppose that the second derivative of f ix)  meets the requirements for it 
to have a Maclaurin’s expansion as far as the first order around the origin. 
Then, to a first order approximation we have
^ /" ( x )c ^ ( /" ( 0 ) + /'" ( 0 )x ) . (143)
Since the second derivative is zero at the origin, this implies
y /" (* )  *  y /" '(0 )x . (144)
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Recall that the fundamental differential equation for a solution is given by
<j2
y / " 0*0  +  (an x +  au f{x))  f ( x ) -  (a2ix  +  a22f(x))  =  0 .
So
— f ( x )  =  -  (au x  +  <*12/ 0*0) f ( x )  + (o2iar +  a22f ( x ) ) . (145)
Differentiating both sides, evaluating the result at x =  0, and then substi­
tuting for /"(0) in approximation (144), gives
y  f n(x) ~  ( - / '  (0) (an +  a12f ( 0)) +  a2i +  a22/ ' ( 0)) x. (146) 
Letting 6 =  /'(0 ) leads to the following
y /" (x )  ~p(8)x  (147)
which is the required result.
□
An inspection of the elements of matrix A  indicates that for the values of 
the macroeconomic parameters postulated, an will be negative while a12 and 
a22 will be positive. In addition, in order for the eigenvectors to represent 
the overshooting case illustrated in figure 4.1, a2\ also needs to be positive. 
It therefore follows that p(0) =  a21 >  0 and that p(Q) reaches a maximum 
between 0s and Qu- A sketch of the function would therefore look as in figure 
4.2. This now enables us to calculate the sign of f  in the neighbourhood of 
the origin. As the angle tan- 1 (0) goes from 0  to ±  90° the sign of f  changes 
with each crossing of an eigenvector. The results for the other two quadrants 
can be readily obtained on recalling that solutions must be antisymmetric. 
Figure 4.3 summarises these results. To complete the qualitative description 
of solutions, we now need to examine the trajectory paths away from the 
origin.
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Figure 4.2 The value of p(9) in the half plane x  >  0.
B
79
Figure 4.3 The sign of f  in the neighbourhood of the origin.
U
u
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Firstly, we shall obtain the line of expected stationarity for x. Using 
the same notation as in the previous section, we have from the system of 
equations (136)
dx =  anxdt -f a\2ydt 4-  adz. (148)
Taking expectations gives
E(dx)t =  anxdt -f a12ydt. (149)
Therefore, along the line of expected stationarity for x we have
E(<te)t— —— =  an x  +  a12y  =  0 . 
at
Hence, for the line of expected stationarity
slope — —— . (150)
ai2
Because of the symmetry of solutions, it is only necessary to consider the 
behaviour of trajectories in one half of the plane. Therefore, taking the right 
hand half-plane, where x  >  0 , we divide this into four regions as shown in 
figure 4.4. Regions A and B lie on either side of the eigenvector SS and below
the line of expected stationarity in x, labelled as LL. Regions C and D lie
on either side of the second eigenvector, UU and above line LL. We shall 
consider the regions in pairs. We first observe that by a standard theorem on 
differential equations, such as in Birkhoff and Rota (1969), pl52, for example, 
the two initial conditions / ( 0 ) =  0  and / ' ( 0 ) =  0 , are sufficient to determine 
a unique solution to the fundamental differential equation in any compact, 
convex region of the (x,y) plane: so the solution trajectories do not intersect 
other than at the origin. We now turn to the first pair of regions.
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Figure 4.4 The four regions in the global analysis of solution paths.
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4.2.3 Trajectories in regions A  and B
Rather than working directly with the function f (x ), it will be convenient 
to use the function g(x) which measures the vertical distance between the 
function /  (x) and the corresponding point on the eigenvector SS. Hence
g(x) =  f(x ) -  6s x. (151)
It follows that
g'  =  f - 9 s
and
g" = /"•
Therefore, while the slope of g differs from that of /  by a constant, the 
convexity/concavity of the two functions is the same for any value of x. 
As a first step in describing the trajectories we shall obtain the differential 
equation that must be satisfied by the function g{x).
Proposition  10 The function g(x) must satisfy the following differential 
equation
ofi
—g" — — ((an  4- a n ^ s ) x +  fli2g) §’ +  (a22 — ^5 ^ 12) 9 •
Proof
First, recall the fundamental differential equation for /
y /" (x )  +  (an x  4 - a12f(x )) f ( x )  -  (a2xx 4 - a22f(x ))  =  0 .
Upon substituting for /  in terms of g we obtain
<T
— g" =  — (gr 4- Os) (o>nx  4- a, 12 (g +  0s x)) 4- <121# 4- a,22 (g +  6sx) . (152)
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This can be rearranged in order to give
(j ^
— g” =  — ((an +  a120 s)x +  ai29 ) 9' +  P (@s)x  +  ( a 22 — 6sa 12) <7- (153)
Upon noting that p(0s) =  0, we obtain the result.
□
In order to characterize paths in these regions it is necessary first to 
demonstrate that the terms multiplying g and g' in the equation (153) are 
both positive. The former coefficient
a 22 — 0Sa 1 2>
is certainly positive because by assumption a22, a12 >  0 , and Os <  0 - For the 
latter coefficient
-  ((an +  a120s ) x  +  a12g) ,
we note that in regions A and B /  lies below the LL locus, which has slope 
—a n /a i2. Therefore it follows that
9 =  1 -  0s x < ailX -  0s x. 
ai2
From which we can deduce that
a i2<7 < — (an +  a i20s) x.
Finally, we obtain the required result that
0 < -  ((an +  a120s ) x  +  a12g) . (154)
We shall examine first the solution paths in region A. In this region, by 
assumption /'(0 ) <  Os so by construction </(0) <  0 . In region A the following 
result holds.
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' Proposition  11 For x>0, (jf (x)< 0.
Proof.
Suppose that this is not the case find that X\ is the smallest strictly 
positive value of x such that g"(xi) =  0. By construction, g and g' will be 
negative in a neighbourhood of the origin, and from the result of Proposition 
9, f" and hence g'r will also be negative in such a neighbourhood. Recall 
that the differential equation that must be satisfied by g is given as follows
(j^
~  ~  ((a l l  +  a 12$s) x  +  a 12g) d' +  (&22 “  ^Sa 12) 9-
It follows that since both the coefficients of g and cf are positive, that either 
#(#1 ) > 0  or cf(x 1 ) >  0 . Assume firstly the case g, (xi) >  0. Then since 
(f is negative in the neighbourhood of the origin it follows that between the 
neighbourhood and ajj, g" must be positive for some values of x. As g" < 0 in 
a neighbourhood of the origin, it follows that since g is continuous, that there 
exists a value x<i, where x  ^ < x\ such that g" =  0 , contrary to hypothesis. 
Similarly, if g(x\) >  0, then because g is negative in a neighbourhood of the 
origin, there must exist values of x < X\ for which cf{x) >  0. Then by the 
foregoing argument, there must the be at least one value of x < Xi at which 
cf' — 0 , contrary to hypothesis again.
□
An analogous argument establishes that g" >  0 for x >  0 in region B, 
that is for all solution paths satisfying the condition
0  <  s'(O) <  -  es .
^12
Thus, the curvature found in a neighbourhood of the origin applies through­
out each of these regions. On the boundary between the two regions, where 
g' =  6Sl g" =  0  for all x >  0 .
4 .2 .4  Trajectories in regions C and D
Here, it will be convenient to define a function h(x) to represent the ‘distance’ 
of /  from the second eigenvector UU. That is
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h(x) =  f ( x)  -  dv x.
The first and second derivatives of h are therefore as follows
t i  =  f - O u  (155)
h" =  /".
As in the analysis in regions A and B, we start by substituting for /  in 
the fundamental differential equation. (139). After simplification, this gives 
the following
<7^
—-h,r =  — ((flu +  0'i2^u)x 4- a i2ti) h! 4- (a22 — Qua 12) h. (156)
We shall show that the coefficients of both h and h' in the above equation
will be negative in regions C and D. As for the former term, a22 — 0uai2i we
note that
p(6u) — —a>\2 Qu 4- (<3-22 ~  cLu)0u 4- a-21 — 0. (157)
So
0-22. “  @ U a 12  — Q 1“ a l l -  (158)
Vu
The result follows after noting that 0 2 1  >  0, and du, an  <  0.
For the second coefficient, — ((flu +  ai20u) x  +  ai2 /i), the requirement 
that
r . ~ an  f  >  x
a 12
implies that
h =  f  — 6jjx >  - x — 6jjx =  
---------------- fl-12
—  + 6 u  ) x .
a12 J
(159)
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So
fll2^ >  — (a l l  “1“ 0i\2^u) x - 
Hence we obtain the required result that
0 >  — ((flu +  o>\2@u) x 4" <ii2h) • (1^0)
To examine the curvature of solutions near eigenvector UU, we begin in 
region D where all the trajectories are connected to the origin. By construc­
tion, this will also be the curvature exhibited by function h. We intend to 
show that trajectories have the qualitative characteristics shown in figure 45 . 
That is, it has a positive slope but is concave near the origin, reaches a max­
imum, and passes through a unique point of inflection before approaching a 
limiting value as x  increases without limit.
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Figure 4.5 The function h(:r) in region D.
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From proposition 9 it follows that /"  < 0 in the neighbourhood of the 
origin for region D,and so by the definition of h(x), establishes that h!'{x) < 0 
for paths starting from the origin with a positive slope. The general charac­
teristics of a solution path, as x  moves away from the origin, are established 
as follows.
P roposition  1 2  There exists a value x\ satisfying H(x\)=0 
Proof
Suppose the proposition is not true. Since h'(0) > 0 in region D, then ex 
hypothesi, h! > 0  for all x >  0  and h is bounded away from zero as x increases, 
and is always positive. However, inspection of the differential equation for h
— h "  = — ((an + a > i2 0 u )x  + a ^ h )  h ' + (022 — & ua  12) h
implies that h" <  0  for all x >  0  and is bounded away from zero as x 
increases. Hence, h' is strictly decreasing and so for some value of x, say, 
h'(x 1) =  0 , contrary to hypothesis.
□
P roposition  13 h(x) is strictly concave over the range 0< x <  X\ and reaches 
a maximum at x\
Proof
As h(0) =  0 and h'(0) > 0, it follows from the fact that the coefficients 
of both h and h' are negative in the differential equation (156), that h" <  0  
over the range 0 <  x <  x±. Since hf(x 1 ) =  0 and h"{xi) <  0 , it follows that 
h{xi) is a maximum.
□
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P roposition  14 For all x>x\, H(x)<0 
Proof
Since the line h =  0 is itself a solution of the differential equation for h, it 
follows from the uniqueness theorem in Birkhoff and Rota (1969), that any 
other solution with h(0 ) =  0  and h\0) > 0 , must remain above the h =  0  
line. Hence, h >  0 for all x >  0.
It follows from the fact that the coefficients for both h and h! are negative 
in the differential equation (156) for h, that at any point where h! =  0 , h" <  0 . 
So if there existed another turning point following X\, this would be a local 
maxima, and hence X\ would have to be a local minima, which can not be 
so. So there can be no such points.
□
The characterization of the trajectories is completed by the following two 
results.
Proposition  15 There exists a unique point of inflection for h(x) at x2 > X\. 
Proof
Since h is bounded from below by zero, and h!(x\) =  0 , h"(xi) <  0 , it 
follows from the differential equation for h, that there must exist some value 
of x > Xi, at which h" passes through zero from below. That is
h" (a;) =  0 , 
hm (x) >  0 .
Let X2  be the smallest such value. Then, differentiating both sides of differ­
ential equation (156) for h, and using the fact that h"(x2 ) =  0, gives
cr2
~^hm{x2) =  — ( a n  +  a^Gu) hr { X 2 )  — a^h! (x-f)2 +  (<222 — ^ < 112) h f (X 2 ) >  0 . 
It follows from the above relationship that
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h’ (*2) >  -  28 a.
Suppose there exists another point of inflection at £ 3 , such that £ 3  > £2 . 
Then by assumption, h"(x3 ) =  0 and h" > 0 for £ 2  <  £ <  £3 . Therefore h" 
must pass through zero from above at £3 . That is h'"(x3 ) <  0.
Now since h" > 0, for £ 2  <  £ <  £3 , it must follow that
h’(x3) >  -  28V.
a 12
But, it is also a consequence of the earlier relationship that such a value for 
h! would imply that h"'(x3 ) >  0, which is a contradiction. Therefore the 
point of inflection at £ 2  is unique.
□
Finally, we note that proposition 14, together with the fact that h is 
bounded below by zero, ensures that h approaches a well defined limit as
£  —► OO.
The arguments needed to characterise paths in region C are very similar 
to those above. The only point of note is that in region C some paths enter 
from region B, and it may be true that h! >  0 when they enter. Therefore, 
the analogue of proposition 1 2  is a demonstration that there exists £ 1  satis­
fying h'(x 1) > 0 , where we pick £ ito  be the smallest value of x satisfying the 
inequality. Subsequent proofs then follow similarly to before, but with suit­
able changes of sign. The foregoing results for the regions A to D, together 
with the requirement that solution paths are antisymmetric, implies that the 
nature of solutions is as shown in figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6 Stochastic solution paths.
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Two special cases are worth noting for the solution paths. First, if a12 =  0 
then the eigenvector UU coincides with the vertical axis, and the regions C 
and D disappear. Solution paths lying in the half-plane where x > 0 are 
globally concave or convex and all points of inflection, other than those at 
the origin, vanish. Second, if an =  a22 — 0, then the two eigenvectors, SS 
and UU, correspond to the horizontal and vertical axes respectively. In this 
case, all turning points vanish.
4.3 Sum m ary
In this Chapter it has been demonstrated how stochastic versions of the mon­
etary and price inertia models can be justified and formulated. If the random 
elements in these models are assumed to follow a Wiener process then an ex­
plicit relationship, up to some constants of integration, between the exchange 
rate and the assumed fundamental variables upon which it depends, can be 
obtained for the monetary model. In general, the exchange rate paths will 
be non-linear except in the situation of a free float when no interventions 
in order to control the exchange rate are assumed. Although an explicit so­
lution for the price inertia model is not in general possible, investigation of 
the qualitative nature of those solution paths indicates that they will also 
be highly non-linear. In both models the potential range of solution paths 
seems extremely large even if their general characteristics can be described, 
and seem to emphasise the complexity and uncertainty in trying to obtain 
a particular solution which adequately describes a practical situation. How­
ever, if further constraints can be incorporated in to the models, for instance 
rules concerning when changes to money supply can take place, the poten­
tial solution paths can be narrowed down considerably or even made unique. 
In the next Chapter we shall impose just such constraints in the context of 
modelling the movement of the exchange rate within an allowable band, a so 
called target zone.
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5 Target zones
5.1 The m onetary m odel
In equation (123) of Section 4.1 the stochastic monetary model for two coun­
tries was shown to have the following general solution
Su(fu) =  / 1 2  +  k/jL 12 +  +  A2e>*h* (161)
where A\ and A2 are constants of integration. Suppose now that a target zone 
is imposed on the range of the fundamental index. As we shall see later, this 
is equivalent to a target zone on the exchange rate itself. In order to obtain 
an explicit solution for the exchange rate as a function of the fundamental 
index, the following assumptions will be made.
1 . Intervention in the foreign exchange market by central banks occurs 
at the boundaries of the target zone. This intervention takes the form 
of an adjustment to relative money supply in order to prevent the 
fundamental index from exceeding the target zone boundary. The in­
terventions are assumed to be instantaneous and infinitesimal. More 
complicated intervention rules are possible, for instance discrete inter­
ventions, or an intra marginal intervention of some form. However, the 
current assumption allows the method of approach to be demonstrated 
most clearly.
2. There is full co-operation between the central banks to render the target 
zone completely credible. This includes full knowledge by the market 
of the target zone and the method of intervention. The assumption 
of credible co-operation between central banks is an important aspect 
of many discussions of exchange rate regimes whether or not involving 
formal target zones. For example Avesani (1990), Delgado and Dumas 
(1993), Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1996), and Walsh (1995), discuss 
the role of central banks and their reputation.
3. The exchange rate, S1 2 , is assumed to be a continuous function of / 1 2  
over the entire target zone interval. This precludes ’jumps’ in the ex­
change rate which would otherwise lead to anticipated excess profit.
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The actual method of intervention can be described in more detail as 
follows. Suppose that when the fundamental index reaches the upper level 
of a target zone, defined for the present on fu  and denoted by / 12, relative 
money supply is adjusted in order to keep the index within the zone. This 
can be done either by country 1 decreasing its money supply or by country 2  
increasing its supply. Relative money supply is adjusted in a similar fashion 
when the index reaches the lower boundary of the target zone, denoted by 
/ i 2 -Therefore, from the relationship (114), the incremental change in the 
fundamental index will now take the form
df 12 =  dm u  +  dv 12, (162)
where m12 =  m i — m 2 .
Inside the band there are no interventions, i.e. dm12 =  0, so as in equation 
(119) the fundamental index follows
df12 =  di/ 12 =  fi12dt +  a 12dzi2. (163)
At the edges of the band, there are infinitesimal interventions to prevent the 
fundamental index from moving outside the band. These interventions can 
be represented by an lower and upper ’regulator7, L and U, such that
dm\2 =  dL — dU, (164)
where dL and dU are non-negative. The change dL, represents increases in 
money supply and is positive only if / 1 2  = / 1 2  > and dU represents reductions 
in money supply and is positive only if / 1 2  =  / 12. Once the fundamental index 
moves inside the band, the intervention ceases. The process governing the 
movement of / 1 2  is therefore a form of regulated Brownian motion. Therefore, 
in these circumstances the incremental change in the fundamental index can 
be represented as follows
df12 =  ^12^  +  0 1 2 ^ 1 2  + d L  — dU. (166)
However, since
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dfu =  fJ>12dt +  <r12dz for f 12 G ( /12, / 12) , 
some member of the general solution under a free float must also characterise
/„ .7 ]i.12’ J 12j
,erval, in-
the movement in the exchange rate when f i2 is in the interior of 
However, since s i2 is assumed to be continuous over the whole im 
eluding at the boundaries, it cannot coincide with a function of a particular 
form in the interior of the interval unless it coincides with the same function 
at the boundaries. Therefore, the dynamics of s 12 under regulated Brown­
ian motion will take the same form as under a free float with appropriate 
boundary conditions.
P roposition  16 The appropriate boundary conditions are that
dsi2 _
— —  =  0  
df12
when / 1 2  =  /  and when f i2 — f 12.
Proof
In order to obtain these conditions, we firstly recall that under a free 
float the relationship for the conditioned expected rate of change was shown 
in equation (1 2 1 ) to be as follows
E(ds12)t _  ds12 a \2d2si2 
dt ^ d f i2 +  2 dfa  '
As the exchange rate is continuous at the boundaries, the above expression 
for the conditional expected rate of change must also hold at the boundaries 
as well as in the interior of the interval. In particular, the expression holds 
at the upper boundary f 12 . Hence
E {dsn (7u ))t =  ( )  dL
However, ( f  i2l Si2(f  12)) is also an equilibrium point for a target zone even 
though the evolution of the fundamental index now follows the process
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df12 — P\2dt &i2dz\2 +  dL — dU.
If Ito’s lemma is applied with this definition of the incremental change for 
/ 1 2  , then at the upper boundary we obtain
E n  n  f ..  -ds12(flt) , ds12(7n)JTT
E{dsu { fu ) \  =  [ i h t - j f c -  +  2dfh )  d t  TtT T  ' (167)
using the fact that dL =  0  at f \ 2 =  / 12- However, comparing the two equa­
tions for the conditional expectations, they would be mutually contradictory 
unless
=  0 j 168)
df 12
Similarly, the point ( / 12> si2 ( / 12)) can lie on a solution for a free float and 
for a target zone, only if
dsi2( / ,J
, ; - 12 =  0 . ( 1 6 9 )
dj 12
□
Therefore, these are the relevant boundary conditions for determining the 
constants of integration. This approach to determining the boundary con­
dition is that adopted by Froot and Obstfeld (1991 a and b). Alternative, 
more heuristic justifications for these boundary conditions have been given in 
some sources, for instance Krugman (1991), and a comprehensive discussion 
of the general topic of smooth pasting conditions is given in Dixit (1993).
Differentiating equation (161), and equating the result to zero at the 
boundaries gives
0  =  1 +  pxA  ieP l^ 12 +  p2A2eP2^ 12 (170)
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0 =  1 +  Pi-i4 ie Pl^i2 +  p2A 2ep2^ .  
Solving these two equations for A\ and A2 produces
(171)
pP^ I-12 — pPlf 12
A! = ---------------------------   (172)
  gPl/l2+P2/ 12^
and
pPlf 12 — pPlJL 12
A2 = ---------------=------------=------- ■. (173)
p2(ePifn +P2f 12 _  g P l/ ia + P 2 / 12)
The solution for the value of the exchange rate under the target zone is there­
fore obtained by substituting these values for the coefficients in to equation 
(161), giving
(eP i—12 — pP2f 12\pPlfl2
s12 — fl2 +  kp, 12 + Pl(gP1Zi2+P2/l2 _  gPl/l2+P2Zi2 ) 
( g P i / 1 2  —  ePl- i 2 )e p ^ X2
(174)
P 2 (g P lZ l2 + p 2 / l2  _  e P l / l 2 + P 2 / ia )
As this function is monotonically increasing over its domain of definition, 
confining the fundamentals to the zone | f 12, / 12] is equivalent to restricting
the exchange rate to the target zone ^ i2 ( / 12) 3 si2 ( / i 2 ) • It is also worth 
noting that if we let the lower barrier, / 12, go to minus infinity, then the 
solution for the exchange rate simplifies to
S12 -  fi2 +  kp,12 -  p" V l(/l2“^12). (175)
If in addition we let the upper barrier, / 12, go to plus infinity, we obtain the 
previously derived linear solution under a free fioat
S12 — /12 +  k p 12.
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Although the majority of the literature regarding the stochastic monetary 
model assumes that interventions at the boundary of the target zone are 
infinitesimal, some consideration, for instance in Flood and Garber (1989) 
and Miller and Weller (1991), has been given to the effect of discrete in­
terventions in such models. After the initial development of the stochastic 
monetary model and its solution by Krugman, the model was quickly applied 
to the subject of speculative attacks on target zones. A collection of papers 
on this topic subsequently appeared in Krugman and Miller (1992). More 
recently, Miller and Zhang (1996), use the model to obtain optimal target 
zone bands given proportional costs of intervention, while other authors have 
applied the basic model to the situation of a managed floating currency but 
without a formal target zone. Svensson (1994) for instance, discusses a man­
aged float where monetary policy is chosen to deliver the desired combination 
of exchange rate stability and domestic monetary independence, while Papi 
(1993), Laskar (1994), and Miller and Papi (1997), discuss optimal policies 
with quadratic intervention costs.
5.2 The price inertia m odel
5.2.1 A  target zone on  th e  real exchange rate
In advocating target zones for exchange rates, Williamson(1985) proposed 
that the monetary authorities in the major industrial countries be prepared 
to adjust the stance of monetary policy so as to keep their real exchange rates 
within broad bands. It was intended that adjustments be made only at the 
edges of these bands, however, so that monetary control could be aimed at 
domestic anti-inflationary objectives within these target zones. This Section 
uses the price inertia model to discuss some of the properties of an exchange 
rate operating in such a zone, and follows the approach described in Miller 
and Weller (1990) and (1991).
P roposition  17 Suppose we define (the log of)  relative real money balances 
as b =  77ii2 — pi2 - In addition, let q =  S12 — P12 denote (the log of )  the real 
exchange rate. Then the dynamics of the system can be represented by the 
following matrix equation
db
E(dq)t =  C
bdt
qdt +
O’ 1 2 ^ 1 2  
0
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where
—k(j) —2(j)kr}
— 1 2q(l — <j)k)
and A is as defined in Section 1±.2.
Proof
In equation (134) of Section 4.2, the rate of change of the relative prices 
was shown to be
=  f  2fcyqsi2 -  P u j j i p  +  2krj) +  (pym n  -  <p(ly +  k ) y n \  ^  +  ' ^
\  Z7 4- k — qryk J
Then using the previously defined notation for the real money balances and 
exchange rate, the above equation can be written as follows
=  +  2<t>kriqdt -  +  k ) y 12d t  +
Z7  +  k — qr/k
As db =  dmi2 — dpi2l if there is no intervention it follows that since m \2 does 
not change
db =  -d p n  =  - ^ ™ - W m d t  +  m  +  k)y12dt _
Z7  +  — (jryk
Similarly, the expected rate of change in the exchange rate was shown in 
equation (132) to be as follows
E(ds \ _  ( 2lrls 12 + P 1 2 ( 1 - I V -  2lV) -  <ntVn -  (1 -  dt
* \  I'y +  k — (p y^k J
It follows from the definition of the real exchange rate, q, that
E(dq)t =  E(ds12)t -  E(dp12)t. (178)
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Since, from equation (176), the expected rate of change in relative prices can 
be written as follows
E(dpi2 )t —
7 <f>bdt 4 - 2<j>kr]qdt — <^(£7 +  k)y12dt
l j  +  k — (jyyk
then substituting for the respective terms in equation (178 we obtain
(179)
E (dq)t =
2lr\qdt — ( 1  — 7  (j>)bdt — 7  (j)ly12 — 'yffrbdt — 2<j)kr)qdt +  <f>(l7  4 - k)yl2dt
Z7  +  k — (jyyk
Upon simplifying, we obtain the expression
E (dq)t =
—bdt 4 - 2 77 (Z — (j>k)cdt +  <f)kyl2dt 
I'y 4 - k — (jrfk
(180)
Therefore, writing the two expressions for db and E (dq)t in matrix form, and 
using the previous definition of A  we obtain
db 
E (dq)t =  C
bdt
qdt +
<712 1^2
0
(181)
where
<7“  A
—k(j) —2(j)kr}
— 1 2  r)(l — (j)k)
and as in Section 4.2 to simplify the notation, we have redefined S12 and 
as deviations from the long-run equilibrium of the deterministic system.
□
For this system, assume that there exists a deterministic functional re­
lationship between real balances and the real exchange rate, which we shall 
denote by 1(b), such that q =  1(b). Then, upon using Ito’s lemma, the fun­
damental differential equation again takes the form
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~~2~~d& ^  C^l1  ^ °12^ db ~  (°21^  °22^  ~  (182)
where c%j are the elements of C.
The solutions to the above equation which satisfy the condition 1(0) =  0, 
are qualitatively similar to those discussed in the previous Chapter. However, 
for the usual overshooting case, the signs of the relevant coefficients will mean 
that the slopes of the two eigenvectors (of C  ) will be the reverse of that shown 
in figure 4.1 .
Suppose now that a target zone is imposed on real money balances b. 
Hence, central banks intervene to prevent b from exceeding the upper bound­
ary 6 , find from falling below b. As in the discussion of the monetary model, 
the centred banks make this intervention by infinitesimal adjustments to rel­
ative money supply. Provided the market is aware of this rule and believes 
it, then this arrangement is equivalent to imposing a target zone on the real 
exchange rate q. That is, as in Section 5.1, control of b between b and 6 , 
simultaneously confines q to a range q to g, provided there exists a solution 
to the above differential equation satisfying the boundary conditions, which 
provides a 1 to 1 relationship between b and q. As with the monetary model 
discussed in Section 5.1, the appropriate boundary condition to be applied 
is that the path of the real exchange rate is tangent to the edges of the band 
(Miller and Weller (1989) and (1990)). The path of the real exchange rate 
will therefore be as illustrated in figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1 Smooth pasting solution in a real exchange rate band.
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5.2.2 A  target zone on th e nom inal exchange rate
Of course, most practical implementations of currency bands involve a zone 
imposed on the nominal exchange rate, with the possibility of realignment 
of the central rate. It would therefore be useful to examine the dynamics of 
the exchange rate within such a zone, subject to price inertia.
In such an arrangement, we shall assume that the target zone imposed on 
the nominal exchange rate between the two countries is denoted by [s1 2 ,512]. 
As before, we assume money stocks are held fixed while the exchange rate is 
in the interior of the band and there is infinitesimal monetary interventions 
required to keep the exchange rate within the zone. Under such an arrange­
ment, it was shown in the previous Chapter that assuming there exits a 
deterministic functional relationship between the nominal exchange rate and 
relative prices, that relationship is given by the solution of equation (139), 
that is
  ^ (a il(p!2  — m12) +  al2 f )  f  — (fl2l(P l2 — ^ 12) +  <222/ )  =  0
where are the appropriate elements of the matrix A  as defined in Section 
4.2. Once again, the appropriate boundary condition will be that the solution 
is tangential to the edges of the band. The qualitative properties of the 
solutions for a nominal exchange rate band can be seen by considering the 
situation where the equilibrium point for the exchange rate is initially in 
the middle of the band and the smooth pasting points also fie symmetrically 
on either side of the equilibrium at p  and p. Suppose that the exchange 
rate is at the lower end of its band at s12 so that relative prices are at 
p. If relative prices increase further due to a random shock generated by 
the Wiener process, the exchange rate would be affected unless there was a 
change in money supply. In the case of a real exchange rate band, the change 
in money supply had to be equal to the change in price level in order to keep 
77112 — P12 constant. However, with a nominal band, because of the form of 
the functioned relationship between the exchange rate and relative prices,viz.
3 i2 “  m 12 =  f (p u  ~  m 12) (183)
the adjustment to money supply need not exactly offset the change in prices 
in order to keep the exchange rate at s12.
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5.3 Summary
If rules such as those listed in Section 5.1, are assumed for how and when 
central banks make interventions then it has been shown that a unique so­
lution path exists for both the monetary and the price inertia stochastic 
models, and in the case of the monetary model an explicit relationship be­
tween the exchange rate and the fundamental variables was obtained. This 
result indicated that although no monetary interventions take place within 
a target zone, the solution path for the exchange rate is far from the linear 
relationship obtained for the pure free float situation described at the end 
of Section 4.1.3. For the price inertia model, the solution paths are also 
non-linear whether the real or nominal exchange rate is being considered. 
In both the monetary model find the price inertia model the solution paths 
generally have an elongated S shaped appearance. This similarity is not too 
surprising since identical intervention rules are assumed for both. In partic­
ular, the assumption that the exchange rate is a continuous function of the 
relevant fundamental variables results in the requirement that the function 
has a turning point at the zone boundaries for both models.
One interesting feature of the stochastic approach is that exchange rates 
fire allowed to move, because of the Wiener process involved, even though 
fundamental variables such as money supply may not change. The models 
therefore provide an additional mechanism for explaining the observation pre­
viously noted in Chapter 2, that the variation in exchange rate movements 
appears much larger than the changes in variables such as money supply 
would normally lead us to expect. On the other hand, as emphasised in 
both this and the previous Chapter, the tractability of the models results 
largely from the assumption that the random element in the model follows a 
Wiener process, and the special properties these processes have. While such 
an assumption is not unreasonable, it is nevertheless just one out of many 
potential processes that might describe a random variable in these circum­
stances. In addition, the derivations and hence results make considerable use 
of Ito’s stochastic calculus. This is of course the most widely applied version 
of stochastic calculus but other variations exist with differing rules and prop­
erties. Both the properties of the Wiener process itself and the properties 
of Ito’s calculus might therefore be supposed to influence the nature of the 
results obtained for both models.
The stochastic models discussed in this Chapter were aimed at describing 
the exchange rate dynamics for two countries operating a target zone. In
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the next Chapter we shall extend the results for the monetary model to 
the situation in which both countries involved in the target zone exist in a 
network with a number of other countries. The dynamics of the exchange 
rate between each pair of countries will be examined, firstly when only one 
target zone exists in the network and then when two zones are assumed to 
be in operation. Lastly, the possibility of a network in which a large number 
of target zones are operating, but with one country taking a central role, is 
considered.
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6 Stochastic m onetary m odels for m ore than  
two countries
6.1 A  small network o f countries
The majority of the literature on modelling the dynamics of the exchange rate 
has so far been concerned with representing the movement between a single 
pair of countries. However, in the real world, bilateral exchange rates exist 
between a group of countries, and because of practiced restrictions such as 
the cyclic no-arbitrage considerations noted in Section 2.1.2, they cannot be 
independent of each other. In this Section we shall develop a model, using the 
stochastic monetary approach, to represent the dynamics of a small network 
of countries. In particular, we shall examine some of the properties of the 
exchange rate between two countries, one of which is involved in a target zone 
relationship with a third country, and the other country whose currency is 
free floating.
In equation (115) of Section 4.1 it was shown that the equation for the 
(log of) the exchange rate between two countries, assuming identical macroe­
conomic parameters in the flexible price monetary model, could be written 
as follows
r , ,.E(dsi2)t$12 — J12 +  k  —---- .
If a target zone is imposed on the exchange rate between these two countries 
then, with the assumptions of Section 5.1, this had the general solution given 
in equation (123), that is
s n ifn )  =  fn  4- kfi12 +  AieP l f l2  +  A2ep*h 2
where
ep2^ i2 — eP2^12
A\ =
Pl(ep ^ + p ^ 2 — ePl/l2+p2 i^a)
and
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gPi/ia — e.Pl—12
A’l — ---------------=--------- =-----------.
/?2 ( e P l^12+ ^2/l2 _ e P l/ l2 + P 2 /12)
As before, /  and f 12 are the lower and upper boundaries on the fundamental 
index corresponding to the exchange rate target zone, and p1 and p2 are 
solutions of the equation
+  P n kP - 1  =  0. (184)
If we assume that there is no deterministic trend in the exchange rate 
movement (that is fi12 =  0), then, as can be seen from equation (184)
Pi ~  ~ p2 -  y  (185)
where a \ 2 is the sum of the variance per unit time period for each of the two 
Wiener processes involved. On writing p — px — — p2i the two coefficients 
can be simplified to the following
P ~ 2P l l 2 ~ p f12 — p - p f i 2 ~ 2 P f  12 
*  =  p(e- * W W » )  ■ ( « >
and
g  Pf 12 — g  PL12 
Ai ~  p(e-W ,2 ^ e-W ,!)' 1^87^
It should be noted that A\ <  0 <  A2.
Suppose that in addition to countries 1 and 2 , which have a credible 
target zone imposed on their common bilateral exchange rate, there exits 
two further countries, 3 and 4, which let their currencies float freely with no 
interventions to their money supply levels, as illustrated in figure 6 .1 .
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Figure 6.1 A four country model.
pKee.lv/ f l o a t i n g
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The bilateral exchange rate between countries 3 and 4 will therefore be 
a fully free floating exchange rate. However, assuming all four countries 
have bilateral exchange rates against each other, any exchange rate between 
country 1  or 2, and either of the other two countries, 3 or 4, will be neither 
free floating, nor a fully targeted rate. Such rates will therefore be referred 
to as semi-floating rates. As before, let Sij denote the log of the exchange 
rate between countries i and j measured in units of currency of country i per 
unit of currency of country j.
Countries 3 and 4 practise identical policies (non-intervention) and there­
fore the qualitative behaviour of their exchange rates vis-ar-vis a given third 
country should also be identical. Hence S13 and Su should share the same 
qualitative properties as should s23 and S2 4 .
Before attempting to derive solutions for the semi-floating exchange rates, 
it should be noted that in a two country target zone model there is no need 
to specify how intervention in the target zone is allocated between the two 
countries. This can be observed from the definition of the index of differences 
in fundamental determinants in Section 4.1, i.e.
fij =  fi ~  f j  =  m i -  rrij -  v i:j.
Provided fij is kept within its bounds, it does not matter whether this is 
achieved by one country increasing its money supply or the other country 
decreasing its own money supply. However, since a semi-floating exchange 
rate is only influenced by the intervention of only one of the target zone 
countries, an exact specification of intervention policy is now needed.
6.2 Intervention policies
Intervention by increasing or decreasing the level of money supply occurs 
when the fundamental index, or equivalently the exchange rate, reaches a 
boundary of the relevant zone. At this point we need to specify the proportion 
of the change which is achieved by one country increasing its money supply 
compared with a decrease by the second country. In order to do so, J0 rgensen 
and Mikkelsen (1997) first define m \ and m f  to be the ‘integral’ of all money 
created and the ‘integral’ of all money withdrawn in a given country i. They 
claim that the usual money supply variable is simply the difference in these 
two quantities, that is
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77lj — 771^  Tfl^  , (188)
and that the fundamental measure, as defined in Section 4.1 can therefore 
be written as
ft =  m l -m™  -  (189)
However, this relationship is not quite as obvious as it may seem. When 
deriving the stochastic version of the monetary model in Section 4.1, the 
variable ra*, was defined as the logarithm of the money supply. It does not 
therefore seem obvious that it should equal either the difference in money 
created and withdrawn, or the difference in their logarithms. However, we 
shall show that the assumption made by j0rgensen and Mikkelsen is valid, 
at least to a first approximation.
P roposition  18 To a first approximation, rhi =  m? —
Proof.
Suppose we let the money supply for country i (before taking logs) be 
represented by M*. Then at any point in time, money supply will equal the 
initial money supply at time zero, ra°, plus the change in supply up time t, 
denoted by . The log of the money supply can therefore be written as 
follows
rrii — 1 n ( M i )  =  ln(m° +  Mf#) =  ln(ra°) +  In ^1 +  • (190)
To a first approximation, this can be represented as
Ilf m c  77)^
rrn =  I n fo 0) +  ^  =  In fo 0) +  (191)mv my my
since the change in money supply will simply be the difference between 
and m f. As the units for measuring money supply are arbitrary within a 
given country, let us choose the initial money supply to be one unit. In which 
case, we obtain (at least to a first approximation),
111
 C .. 111TTli — TTl^  Tfl^  ,
as used by J0rgensen and Mikkelsen.
□
Using this approximation, the index of the difference in fundamental deter­
minants between countries 1 and 2, can be written as follows
/ 1 2  =  f l -  h  =  (mi +  ™%) -  (ml +  m 2 ) -  (192)
That is, if for example currency 1 is too strong relative to currency 2, whether 
country 1 increases or country 2 decreases money supply does not matter for 
the target zone exchange rate since both have the same effect on the first 
term from the right hand side of the above equation. Also, if currency 2 is 
too strong the monetary authorities have two possible solutions. The first 
is to let country 1 withdraw some of its money and the second is to let 
country 2 create more of its own. Alternatively, interventions may be split 
between the countries in some systematic fashion according to some rules. 
Before looking at a possible formulation of such a set of rules, it is worth 
noting that (raj +  m™) and {m™ +  raj) correspond to the variables L and U 
respectively, as introduced in Section 5.1, when discussing the solution of the 
monetary model with a target zone.
Let us suppose that at the upper boundary of the target zone country 1 
withdraws a certain amount of its currency while country 2 creates money, 
and that the amounts withdrawn and created are in a fixed proportion. Sim­
ilarly, at the lower boundary, we shall suppose that the amount of money 
withdrawn and created by countries 2 and 1 respectively, are also in a con­
stant proportion. These rules governing the amount of intervention at the 
edges of the target zone can be summarised as follows
dm™ =  l \d m c2 (193)
dm™ =  7 2 draJ (194)
where and 72 are non-negative constants. Since a country defends its
currency when it is relatively weak by withdrawing some of its own money
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from the market, r)i can be interpreted as an index of the degree of “self- 
defence” when country i’s currency is weak. If 7 < >  1 (7 i <  1) country 
i intervenes more (less) relative to the other country when its currency is 
weak. It will be convenient in what follows to define the following relative 
weights
=  1 =  1,2 (195)
' li
where 0 < A, <  1 by construction and A* > 0.5 (A* < 0.5) corresponds to 
7i >  1 ( li <  1)-
P roposition  19 With the foregoing notation, the exchange rate between coun­
try 1 and country j  (j=3,4 ), is as follows
sij — fij +  AjAie^12 4- (1 — X2)A2e p*12.
Proof.
Consider the two components Aiep*12 and A2e~pfl2 which arise in the 
solution of
E(ds12)t 
S12 — f n  +  k — —— .
They are due to the expectations term in the above equation. As noted 
earlier, A\ <  0, so it follows that Aiep*12 is the term which results from 
interventions at the upper boundary of the target zone, that is, as currency 
1 weakens. (It was noted in Section 4.1 that if there was no upper boundary 
to the zone, the constant of integration A \, must be zero in order to avoid 
explosive growth ). This term arises as a result of investors’ expectations 
to the publicly announced credible intervention that will take place should 
the rate reach its upper margin. Since everybody knows the distribution 
of intervention among the two countries represented by the weight Ai, the 
term can be divided into country specific components. As the proportion of 
the intervention that will be performed by country 1 is simply A1? the term 
arising from the expectation of the intervention that will be performed by 
country 1 when the exchange rate reaches its upper boundary is A1A1ep/l2
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and the corresponding term for country 2 is (1 — Xi)Aiepfl2. Similarly, since 
A2 >  0, (1 — X2) A26 arises from the expected intervention that country 1 
performs if the exchange rate reaches its lower boundary (currency 2 weakens) 
and X2A2e~pf12 is a consequence of the promised intervention by country 2 
in this case. Given the nature of the monetary model, provided all relevant 
macroeconomic and financial parameters are assumed to be identical in the 
countries concerned, intervention by a given country influences all exchange 
rates between that country and other countries, equally. Hence, an exchange 
rate between a country participating in a target zone and a third country, will 
be fully affected by the expectation of intervention by the given country from 
the target zone. Thus, the implied solution for the exchange rate between 
country 1 and country j  (j =  3,4) will take the form
Sij =  f ij  +  XiAiepfl2 +  (1 — X2)A2e p*12. (196)
□
There is no term arising from the expectation of interventions by country 
j  in the above solution since this country’s known policy is not to alter its 
money supply (to affect its exchange rate at least). Similarly, the implied 
semi-floating solutions involving country 2 are
•sy =  h i  -  (1 -  . (197)
The minus sign in front of the two exponential terms arises because when­
ever country 1 intervenes by withdrawing money (for example at the upper 
boundary of the target zone), country 2 intervenes by creating money. This 
would of course have the opposite effect on the exchange rate between coun­
try 1 and a third country, and between country 2 and a third country. The 
same argument applies at the lower boundary of the zone.
The foregoing solutions for the semi-floating rates provide intuitively ac­
ceptable results at the extremities of the intervention policy. For instance, 
suppose Ai =  1 and A2 =  0. This would correspond to country 1 making 
all the interventions at the extremes of the target zone. This policy would 
amount to a unilaterally enforced target zone. In such an arrangement, the 
exchange rates between country 1 and third countries should be fully affected
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by the expectations of those interventions, while those between country 2 and 
third countries should not be affected at all and are effectively free floating. 
An inspection of the above semi-floating solutions indicates that this is pre­
cisely the result which follows upon putting Ai =  1 and A2 =  0. The equations 
for the exchange rates being as follows
«y =  h i  +  +  4 >e'p/n
$2j =  h j-
Conversely, if in the above solutions we put Ai =  0 and A2 =  1, only 
exchange rates involving country 2 are affected by the expected interventions, 
in line with what might be anticipated intuitively.
In addition to agreeing with what should be predicted from theory, the 
semi-floating solutions must also obey the cyclic no-arbitrage conditions given 
in equation (27) of Section 2.1.2. For instance, for a cycle of three countries 
involving countries 1 and 2 and either country 3 or 4, when dealing with the 
logarithms of exchange rates we must have
S12 +  s2j +  sji — 0 (j =  3,4). (198)
Since, from Section 2.1.2, Sji — — Sij, the above no-arbitrage condition is 
equivalent to
Sl2 “t- ®2j =  l^j* (199)
Substitution from the relevant formulae for the targeted and semi-floating 
exchange rates, indicates that the above no arbitrage condition is indeed 
met. Similarly, it is not difficult to verify that the no-arbitrage condition is 
fulfilled for all other cycles in this small network.
Although the foregoing derivation of the solution for semi-floating ex­
change rates is valid for quite general values for Ai and A2 , J0rgensen and 
Mikkelsen describe two particular intervention policies in which A2 and A2 
are related. These are as follows.
D efin ition 20 An intervention policy is u n i f o r m  if =  721 or equiva­
lently, Aj -f- A2 — 1.
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D efin ition  21 If =  7 2 or equivalently, Ai =  A2, the intervention policy 
is said to be sym m etric .
To illustrate these two concepts, consider figure 6.2, containing possible 
(Ai, A2) combinations. On the uniform fine, A2 =  1 — Ai, the imphcation is 
that country 2 performs the same relative share of the intervention regardless 
of which currency is weak. Since the same argument holds for country 1, the 
level of intervention is distributed uniformly for a given country. On the 
line where A! =  A2, the intervention policy is symmetric in the sense that 
countries 1 and 2 perform the same fraction of the required intervention 
when their respective currency is weak. The two lines intersect at Ai =  
A2 =  | ,  corresponding to a uniform and symmetric policy. Finally, it is 
worth reiterating the point that the derivation and solutions to these models 
requires that the intervention policy, including the weights Ai and A2, is 
announced publicly and is credible, so that investors can form expectations 
accordingly.
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Figure 6.2 Uniform and symmetric intervention policies.
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6.3 M ultiple target zones
Having seen the effect that a target zone has on the semi-floating exchange 
rates bordering the zone, it is relevant to ask what the effect might be of 
more than one target zone in the network. Consider again the network of 
four countries illustrated in figure 6.1. In addition to the previous target 
zone between countries 1 and 2, suppose that there is also a target zone 
between countries 3 and 4. How now would the exchange rate such as that 
between countries 1 and 3, behave? As before, let us suppose that there is 
no deterministic trend in either of the two target zone exchange rates, so the 
two target zones between countries 1 and 2, and between countries 3 and 4 
would, by reference to equation (123), have respective solutions of the form
*x 2 =  /1 2  +  A ie p^ h2 +  A 2e - p" h '  (2 0 0 )
s34 =  fM +  A3e ^ !M + Ai e - ^ fM, (201)
where the Ai (i =  1 ,2 ,3 ,4) are constants of integration which are evaluated 
as before, and subscripts on the parameter p indicate that this parameter 
need not be identical for each pair of countries.
P roposition  22 For the above arrangement, the exchange rate between coun­
tries 1 and 3 is given as follows
313 =  fis +  X iA ie " ^  +  (1 -  A2)^ 2e“',)2/lJ -  A s^e'’" * 4 -  (1 -  \ i )AAe - “^ .  
Proof.
Consider the exchange rate between countries 1 and 3. As before, market 
expectations will be influenced by the interventions of country 1, and by the 
same argument as previously given, this will contribute the following term 
to the expected rate of change
X iA ie " ^  +  (1 -  X2)A2e->’^ !
where Ai and A2 are defined as before. However, in addition to the interven­
tions from country 1, the market’s expected rate of change of the exchange
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rate S13, will be influenced by interventions by country 3. By an analogous 
argument to the contribution from country 1 , country 3 will contribute the 
following term to the expected rate of change
—A3A3ep**h4 -  ( 1  -  A4)A ie-p34/34,
where A3 and A4 are defined analogously to Ai and A2 . The minus sign arises 
from two facts. Firstly, that a withdrawal of money by country 3, represented 
by the first component of the above term, should result in an increase to s13, 
and secondly, that As like A\, is negative. The second component is also 
negative by a similar argument. The full solution for the exchange rate 
between countries 1 and 3 is therefore
S13 =  /13 +  A1/ l 1ePn/l2 +  (1 -  A2) ^ 2e ' Pn/l2
-A 3 ^ e '’34/34 -  ( 1  -  A4 )J44 e“'’34/34. (2 0 2 )
□
The exchange rate between countries 1  and 3 is now driven by monetary in­
terventions by both countries. This exchange rate is therefore at the mercy of 
not only the random fluctuations resulting from the Wiener process forming 
part of / 13, but also the interventions occurring whenever the exchange rates 
s 12 and S34 reach the boundaries of their target zones. It does not therefore 
seem appropriate to continue to refer to such exchange rates as semi-floating, 
a more appropriate term might be target-zon e driven rates.
Once again it can be shown that the exchange rate models derived in this 
manner obey the cyclic no-arbitrage conditions. For instance, using similar 
arguments to the above, the exchange rate s23 would be given as follows
323 =  / 23 -  A2 A2e- ^ / l2  -  (1 -  A1)AaeP l2 /l2
~A3 A3 ePM/34 -  (1 -  X ^ A ^ - ^ 34. (203)
Cyclic no-arbitrage conditions would require that
_ Sl2 +  S23 =  S13.
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Substitution for the three exchange rates, confirms that this condition does 
indeed hold. It is straightforward to check that the cyclic no arbitrage con­
dition is fulfilled for all other possible cycles in this small network.
The above argument shows that it is possible in this network to incor­
porate more than one target zone. This is possible because in each cycle of 
exchange rates one of the rates is available to be driven by the others in 
the cycle. The cyclic no-arbitrage condition can therefore always be met. 
However, it is not difficult to see that including a third exchange rate with 
a target zone in to this network would mean that an assumption would be 
breached at some point. In order to demonstrate this suppose a target zone 
was imposed on the exchange rate between countries 1 and 3, in addition 
to those between countries 1 and 2, and between 3 and 4. Let us suppose
512 is close to its upper boundary, in which case the currency from country 
1 is relatively weak. According to our earlier arguments, this would require 
a contraction of domestic money supply by country 1 in order to defend its 
currency. However, assume that at the same point in time the exchange rate
513 is at its lower boundary. This is quite possible since within target zone 
boundaries, the only mechanisms driving the exchange rates are the inde­
pendent Wiener processes. Now, a withdrawal of money by country 1 at this 
juncture would not only strengthen its currency with respect to country 2  
but with respect to country 3 also. This would therefore have the effect of 
making the exchange rate S13 smaller, thereby pushing it through its lower 
target zone boundary. Indeed, such an arrangement would contravene the 
assumption of a country only adjusting its money supply at the boundary of 
a particular target zone. This potential conflict seems to be inevitable, given 
the assumptions of this model, whenever a particular country is involved in 
target zone arrangements with more than one other country, as was country 
1  in the above example. Other authors, for example Biggs (1993) have con­
cluded similar results for a cycle of three countries operating within bands 
defined by the cost of transporting gold.
The potential conflict faced by a country involved in more than one tar­
get zone arrangement has some practical implications, as the next Section 
illustrates.
6.4 M ulti-country exchange rate mechanisms.
Consider a network of countries in which one of them has a centred role in the 
sense that all other countries have a target zone imposed on their exchange
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rate with the central country. However, non-central countries do not inter­
vene in order to influence their exchange rate against any other non-central 
country. This arrangement can be represented diagrammatically as in figure 
6.3. In this case, the central country has been shown as Germany, with the 
UK., France, and Italy as the non-central countries. This situation might 
for instance represent a simplified version of the arrangement under the Ex­
change Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). 
In this mechanism, it was generally acknowledged that the Deutschemark 
held a central position or standard, compared with the other EMS curren­
cies.
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Figure 6.3 
role.
A four country network with Germany taking a central
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In general, the formula for the exchange rate between the UK. (coun­
try 2) and Germany (country 1) would be extremely complicated, as would 
the formulae for the rates between the other non-central countries and Ger­
many. This is a result of market expectations for the rate of change of the 
U.K./German exchange rate, being influenced not only by German interven­
tions to preserve the £/D m  target zone but interventions by Germany to 
preserve other zones involving itself, also. Indeed, the frequent interventions 
by Germany at the edges of the various zones, would as noted in the last Sec­
tion, lead to a potential conflict in maintaining all the zones simultaneously, 
at least in the situation of each country intervening by a known, non-zero, 
proportion (A*).
However, suppose we assume that all the target zones in the network 
are unilaterally imposed, as defined in Section 6.1. That is, Germany does 
not change its money supply at any stage, all interventions at target zone 
boundaries being undertaken by the corresponding non-central country. In 
such a situation, the exchange rate model between a non-central country, 
such as the UK. and Germany is, by analogy to equation (200), as follows
« 12 =  fvt +  A12ePl2/lJ +  A22e - » ^ . (204)
where the second subscript on the constants of integration indicates that 
these refer to the (only) target zone involving the UK., country 2. The 
constants of integration involved in the solution for the target zone exchange 
rates between Germany and the other non-central countries, can be given 
similar subscripts to distinguish them.
The above solution is simply the form for the exchange rate in a target 
zone, between any two countries with no drift parameter. Only country 2 
(UK) intervenes to support the zone, and as noted before, does not inter­
vene against any other country. The exchange rates between Germany and 
all other non-central countries would, because of identical arguments, take 
a similar form. In this situation there would be no potential conflict for 
the central country, since it plays a purely passive role. Although this is a 
relatively simple exchange rate model, the conclusion that in order to avoid 
potential conflict, ideally all of intervention must come from the non-central 
countries, at least in part justifies the perceived unwillingness by Germany 
to intervene during ERM crises, particularly the one involving the pound on 
‘black Wednesday’. Of course, in practise political considerations inevitably
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influence the intervention policy of the countries concerned irrespective of 
exchange rate models. For example, a comprehensive discussion of the ac­
tual monetary policies which affected the ERM the 1990’s is given in De 
Grauwe (1995). These political difficulties in adopting and keeping to an in­
tervention policy are at least some of the reasons for replacing the ERM by a 
single currency within the European Union, the case for which is discussed in 
Emerson, Gros, Italianer, Pisani-Ferry, and Reichenbach (1992). Wiliamson 
(1992), suggested alternative reforms to the ERM in order to overcome some 
of the observed difficulties in its operation.
In the network described in figure 6.3, exchange rates between any pair 
of non-central countries, for instance the UK. and France (country 3), will be 
target zone driven rates. This follows since although there is no target zone 
operating between the Pound and the Franc, both countries are changing 
their money supply in order to defend a zone against a third country. As 
the U.K. and France are undertaking all the interventions to defend their 
respective zones against Germany, the whole of these interventions will be 
reflected in the markets’ expected rate of change for S2 3 . The exchange rate 
between the UK. and France would therefore, using the arguments of the 
previous Section, take the following form
S23 =  fxt ~  Ai2^ » /ia -  A n e -^ ™  +  A 1 3eH»fa +  (205)
In determining the various effects on S23 in equation (205), it is worth recalling 
that A n  and Ais will both be negative, while A22 and A 23 will both be 
positive. The equations for the other target zone driven exchange rates can 
be derived in a similar fashion.
6.5 Summary
When changes in money supply are made at the boundary of a target zone 
it is immaterial to the dynamics of the exchange rate whether the change 
results from an increase in supply by one country or a decrease in supply by 
the other. This is because in the monetary model only the relative monetary 
supply is of importance. However, the proportion of intervention undertaken 
by each country certainly is of relevance when the exchange rate against a 
third country is considered. Once the rules for allocating the proportion of 
intervention by each country are specified the relationship for the exchange
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rate between a country in the target zone and the third country can be readily 
obtained. These semi-floating rates consist of a combination of two terms 
each reflecting the expected amount of money to be created or withdrawn by 
the target zone participating country at each boundary.
If the network consists of two pairs of target zone participating countries 
then the model for the exchange rate between a pair of countries in differ­
ent zones will consist of a combination of terms each reflecting the expected 
proportion of money creation or withdrawal at each zone boundary. These 
target zone driven rates are, like target zone rates themselves, non-linear 
even though neither of the participating countries alters its money supply in 
order to influence the rate between them directly. The results emphasise the 
fact that if a country adjusts its monetary policy as part of a target zone 
relationship with another country, it will inevitably have repercussions for its 
exchange rate movements with all other countries, intended or not. Under 
normal circumstances if a country is involved in more them one target zone 
relationship this will invariably result in a potential conflict in its monetary 
policy at some point in time. However, as Section 6.4 demonstrated, if all 
the target zone relationships are between one central country and a number 
of non-central countries, then no conflict need arise provided all the interven­
tions are made by the non-central countries. The potential for such conflicts 
is something which groups of countries such as those which were involved 
in the ERM, need to bear in mind when the rules governing intervention 
policies are formulated.
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7 Conclusion
Although some interest had been given to the movement of exchange rates 
prior to the 1970’s, this was mainly in the context of a possible speculative 
attack on a fixed rate and the implications for a country’s foreign currency 
reserves. This was at least partly the result of the Bretton Woods Agreement 
of 1944 whose objective was to prevent, if possible, a return to the competi­
tive devaluations and protectionism that had characterized the period before 
World War II. Under the Bretton Woods system, countries undertook to 
preserve a fixed exchange rate until unambiguous evidence of ‘fundamental 
disequilibrium’ appeared, at which point they were expected to devalue or 
revalue as appropriate. That is, announce a new fixed parity against the US 
dollar. This arrangement continued in very much its original form until the 
late 1960,s, when the system came under considerable strain. The exchange 
rates agreed at Bretton Woods became increasingly inappropriate. The US 
had experienced relatively sluggish growth in its productive capacity since 
World War II, while the economies of continental Europe and Japan expe­
rienced rapid expansion. In addition, the US authorities were increasingly 
willing to print money during the 1960’s in order to combat poverty at home 
and to finance the war in Vietnam. This not only made the dollar seem over­
valued against other currencies such as the Deutsche Mark but put a strain 
on the fixed exchange rate of $35 per ounce of pure gold agreed at Bretton 
Woods. The system finally broke down in 1971 and although attempts were 
made to patch-up the fixed rate system through the Smithsonian Agreement 
this lasted barely a year, after which the modem era of floating exchange 
rates effectively came in to being.
The existence of floating exchange rates on a wide scale inevitably gave 
impetus to attempts at understanding the dynamical properties of such rates 
and the variables which influence them. The introduction of floating ex­
change rates was therefore followed fairly swiftly by the modem exposition 
of the deterministic monetary model by researchers such as Mussa (1976), 
and of the price inertia model in Dombusch (1976). These remain the major 
models for describing the movement of exchange rates although modifications 
such as the possibility of currency substitution, have been incorporated in to 
the models by various authors, including Gartner (1994). These modifica­
tions assume that domestic agents are allowed to hold foreign money as an 
asset in addition to domestic currency. In general, these modifications make 
little difference to the main properties of the models although the intensity of
126
some phenomena, such as the overshooting effect in the price inertia model, 
may be affected. Currency substitution has also been given a more central 
role by authors such as Calvo and Rodriguez (1977), in which the demand for 
money and goods is related to domestic wealth rather than current income. 
However, giving currency substitution such a central role in the determina­
tion of exchange rate movements is only likely to be justifiable in extreme 
circumstances, for instance hyperinflation in the domestic economy. There­
fore, it is legitimate to concentrate, as this thesis has done, on the basic 
monetary and price inertia models.
In Chapter 2, it was noted that both the models considered were useful in 
focusing attention on the variables which might affect exchange rates and in 
providing predictions of how rates may behave in the future. In the case of 
the monetary model discussed in Section 2.1, these predictions did not seem 
to agree very well with the data, except in the long-term, reflecting the evi­
dence against PPP holding on a continuous basis. The price inertia models 
mentioned in Section 2.2 were rather more realistic in describing short-term 
movements in exchange rates, relying as they do on the more credible as­
sumption of stickiness of price movements. However, as noted by Macdonald 
(1988), even these models and their derivatives do not track the movements 
of the major exchange rates particularly well. Possibly their greatest contri­
bution has been the demonstration that mechanisms exist which explain why 
observed exchange rate movements can be much greater than the movement 
in the fundamental variables upon which they depend.
The usefulness of both the monetary and price inertia models was given 
a boost in the early 1990’s with the development of their stochastic versions. 
The use of stochastic calculus in Section 4.1 allowed a closed form solution 
(subject to the evaluation of constants of integration) to be derived for the 
monetary model. This indicated that even for a relatively simplistic model 
of this form the solution paths are, in general, highly non-linear. Although 
the stochastic price inertia model discussed in Section 4.1 did not have a 
closed form solution, the qualitative analysis given there again illustrated 
the non-linear nature of potential solution paths. The use of stochastic mod­
els for modelling movements within target zones, discussed in Chapter 5, 
demonstrated that with the imposition of suitable boundary conditions the 
trajectory for the exchange rate movement can be tied down, at least in its 
general form. The results emphasised that these trajectories would have quite 
different properties to what naively might be expected from an exchange rate 
which experienced a free float within a target zone mechanism such as the
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ERM.
Chapter 6 demonstrated how the exchange rate movement between two 
countries, one of which is engaged in a target zone relationship and one which 
has a policy of a free floating currency, could be described for an underly­
ing monetary model. In particular, Jprgensen and Mikkelsen observed that 
although it does not matter which of the two countries involved in a tar­
get zone makes a monetary adjustment, when the exchange rate is at the 
boundary of the zone, for describing movements in that rate, it does matter 
from the point of view of a third country. The modelling of these so called 
semi-floating rates therefore required the rules for target zone interventions 
between participating countries to be made explicit so that market expecta­
tions for exchange rate movements could be formulated. If this is done along 
the lines described by Jprgensen and Mikkelsen then explicit solutions for 
the movement of semi-floating could readily be obtained. By using a similar 
approach in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, it was shown how the dynamics of exchange 
rates within networks containing more than one target zone or in which one 
country has a central role, respectively, could be described. These extensions 
to networks are potentially useful since real life currency arrangements such 
as the ERM invariably involve more than two countries often with a mixture 
of types of relationships between the countries. As noted earlier, the mone­
tary model has many limitations, so it would seem potentially useful if some 
of the situations considered in Chapter 6 could be analysed with the price 
inertia model. However, many of the extra complexities of the model which 
make it a more realistic describer of short-term movements in exchange rates, 
would make analysis considerably more difficult. In particular the lack of a 
closed form solution for the basic price inertia model would make the formu­
lation of a dynamical system to describe even semi-floating rates considerably 
more problematic.
Stochastic models have since their formulation been useful in modelling 
speculative attacks on currencies operating within a band and more recently 
in describing optimal policies for managing a floating exchange rate, for in­
stance by Miller and Papi (1997). In some ways, the increasing number of 
central banks with independence of operation in recent years, for instance the 
Bank of England, and the European Central Bank, has if anything tended 
to increase the relevance of the analyses produced using these models. This 
follows since the assumptions behind the operation of a target zone given 
in Section 5.1 require that central banks co-operate in the carrying out of 
intervention policies and that such interventions are credible to the market.
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It could be argued that both of these are more likely the greater indepen­
dence central banks have of other political considerations. Walsh (1995), 
and Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1996) have also discussed the role and 
reputation of central banks in modelling exchange rate regimes. However, al­
though the realism of some of their proposed intervention policies may have 
increased over recent years, many of the fundamental assumptions behind 
the stochastic models, suffer from the same limitations as their deterministic 
counterparts, particularly those for the monetary model. Therefore, possi­
bly their usefulness lies in the qualitative properties of their results rather 
than an expectation that they will track actual exchange rates any more 
successfully than their predecessors.
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